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T HE greatest impact of the Seminole Tribe v. Florida1 decision will
likely be felt in the range of federal causes of action that have
exclusive remedies in federal court.2 Antitrust cases are among
such causes of action.3 In seeking to avoid antitrust liability, de-
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
2. See id. at 1118, 1125-28 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989), by holding that Eleventh Amendment precludes United States Congress
from authorizing suits against states pursuant to federal statutes enacted under
Congress's Commerce Clause power). Congress may thus abrogate state sovereign
immunity to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to § 5 of that amend-
ment. See id. at 1125 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)). In
Seminole Tribe, the United States Supreme Court recalled its earlier decision in Fitz-
patrick in noting that "§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions
expressly directed at the States and that § 5 of the Amendment expressly provided
that 'The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."' Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453). The Seminole
Tribe Court went on to explain that "through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal
power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and
therefore that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate
the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment." Id.
3. See id. at 1134 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Other such federal statutory
schemes include bankruptcy, trademark and copyright, and environmental laws.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent in Seminole Tribe predicted that the major-
ity's decision would "prevent[ ] Congress from providing a federal forum for a
broad range of actions against States." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, some
bankruptcy and copyright act cases decided after the Seminole Tribe ruling are con-
sistent with this fear.
In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 1995), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had abrogated state sov-
ereign immunity under the Lanham and Copyright Acts when it denied immunity
2
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fendants have invoked the protections of the antitrust state action
doctrine, which immunizes only that anticompetitive activity im-
posed and supervised by states. 4 This immunity bars suits against
state and private actors alike. After Seminole Tribe, state defendants
will escape all antitrust liability, whether or not the traditional re-
quirements of the state action doctrine have been met. Thus, the
state action doctrine is likely to be transformed into an antitrust
exemption for private party defendants only, while state govern-
mental entities will be completely protected from suit in federal
court by constitutional sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.
The state action doctrine, which provides immunity against an-
titrust violations, has been incrementally developed by the federal
courts over the past fifty-three years.5 In the wake of the Seminole
from copyright violations to a state university for publishing copies of short stories
without the writer's consent. See id. at 546-48 (finding that Congress has and exer-
cised authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its copyright pow-
ers), vacated and remanded sub nom. University of Houston v. Chavez, 116 S. Ct. 1667
(1996) (remanding case for further consideration in light of Seminole Tribe deci-
sion). Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
allowed a Chapter 11 trustee to proceed against a state indemnity fund and a state
commission to recover funds allegedly transferred in violation of the Bankruptcy
Code. Matter of Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
that Congress has exercised authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursu-
ant to its bankruptcy powers), vacated and remanded sub nom. Ohio Agric. Commod-
ity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 116 S. Ct. 1411 (1996) (remanding case for further
consideration in light of Seminole Tribe decision). Under the broad grant of state
sovereign immunity announced in Seminole Tribe, plaintiffs in cases such as these
may be precluded from pursuing their federal remedies. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S.
Ct. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (predicting effects of majority decision).
4. See PHILiP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusT LAw 209.1a, at
105 (1996 Supp.) ("[F]ederal antitrust law allows the states to depart from the
ordinary market principles underlying the Sherman Act (1) if the state really wants
to displace federal antitrust law and manifests that policy choice through an affirm-
ative and clearly articulated expression and (2) if the resulting private power is
actively supervised by public officials."). See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (finding California
scheme for wine pricing was preempted by Sherman Act because state failed to
actively supervise scheme as it "neither established nor review[ed] the reasonable-
ness of the price schedules; nor [did] it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts");
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (upholding California agricultural pro-
rate program over Sherman Act preemption challenge because state-adopted pro-
gram was actively supervised in that "the state itself exercise[d] its legislative
authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its
application").
5. The basic substantive antitrust statutes are broad and general. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (Sherman Act) (prohibiting, in general, restraints of trade
and monopolization); 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994) (Clayton Act) (prohibiting re-
straints of trade and monopolistic mergers). This lack of specificity has required
the federal courts to construct and develop how the antitrust laws will be applied.
According to Areeda and Turner:
3
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Tribe decision concerning state sovereign immunity, the state action
doctrine is likely to undergo significant practical and theoretical
changes.
The state action doctrine for antitrust immunity requires
courts to balance two fundamental, and sometimes conflicting, poli-
cies: (1) competition, which is the rationale of the antitrust laws
and (2) state sovereignty, which includes the power to supplant the
competitive marketplace by imposing anticompetitive regulations. 6
To balance these two policies, the state action doctrine requires
courts to investigate the commitment of a state government to its
challenged state regulations and policies, and to determine
whether the state is properly advancing its sovereign interests in
supplanting competition. 7 If a court finds that a state government
meets these requirements, then the state action doctrine provides
that state sovereignty triumphs over competition.8 On the other
hand, if a court concludes that the state was not sufficiently commit-
ted to its regulatory policy, then application of the antitrust laws
would not tread upon state sovereignty. Thus, competitive interests
can safely be given precedence. 9 This commitment is shown by a
Just as the courts have created and developed the law of contracts and
torts, with, to be sure, occasional or substantial intervention by the legisla-
ture, so also the federal courts have created a complex and intricate body
of antitrust law based on a few dozen words in the several governing
statutes.
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAw, 106, at 15 (1978). As
the law of antitrust developed, the Supreme Court announced the existence of the
state action doctrine to give deference to state anitcompetitive policies over federal
antitrust laws. Id. 209, at 60. See Parker; 317 U.S. at 351 ("There is no suggestion
of a purpose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act's legislative history.").
6. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52 (balancing state sovereignty powers of estab-
lishing agricultural prorating program against Sherman Act's goal of promoting
competition); AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 4, 209.2, at 114 ("Although the
effect [of the statute in Parker] was to displace the competitive market ... for the
benefit of California producers at the expense of consumers throughout the coun-
try, the Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to prevent the States
from regulating commerce.").
7. See, e.g., Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-52 (finding adequate commitment by Cali-
fornia in advancing agricultural prorate program).
8. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 209, at 60 ("[A] ntitrust laws may be
impliedly exempt, as 'state action,' conduct which is actually regulated by a state
under a clear policy to substitute regulation for the strictures of the antitrust
laws.").
9. Cf id. 213a, 214a, at 73, 80-81 (discussing reasons for requiring active
state supervision of state regulatory scheme and clear expression of state intent to
supplant antitrust laws in order for state action immunity to be appropriate). Anti-
trust laws are aimed at promoting competition and market control, while state
action immunity allows states to determine "areas inappropriate for market con-
trol." Id. 213a, at 73. Thus, the adequate supervision requirement ensures that
states who pursue an anticompetitive policy will actively watch the area where it
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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legislative intent to supplant competition and active supervision of
the activity by the state. Finally, this balancing process utilized by
the courts to analyze the intent of state legislatures and the authen-
ticity of state supervision has historically allowed states, state agen-
cies and state departments to be sued in federal court under the
antitrust laws and to be found liable if the state failed to meet the
judicial test for state action immunity.
The Seminole Tribe decision views state sovereignty under the
Eleventh Amendment as the policy of overriding importance, not
subject to being weighed against any other competing interest such
as competition. 10 Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment will
trump the antitrust state action doctrine by immunizing states from
private antitrust suits in federal court without requiring any inquiry
into whether the state was acting as a true sovereign or whether
application of the antitrust laws would interfere with governmental
interests. 1
It must be recognized that the actual impact of the Seminole
Tribe decision upon states themselves is likely to be felt in relatively
few cases, because few antitrust cases have named state entities as
defendants and fewer still have awarded relief.12 The decision,
however, will have a potentially important impact upon private
firms that claim state action immunity when acting pursuant to state
statutes that supplant competition. It will also affect persons in-
jured in their "business or property" by state policies that limit com-
petition. 13 Finally, although Seminole Tribe was not an antitrust case,
its decision on state sovereign immunity will alter two types of gov-
ernmental and private relationships under the antitrust laws: (1)
the balance of power between the states and the federal govern-
ment and (2) the liability of states to persons harmed by state gov-
ernment policies affecting competition.
exists. Id. Furthermore, requiring a clear expression of state intent to displace
antitrust law helps to limit "errors in the federal perception about state policy." Id.
I 214a, at 81.
10. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,1133 (1996) (hold-
ing Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign im-
munity pursuant to any power granted by Commerce Clause).
11. See id. at 1131-32 (holding Eleventh Amendment not subject to subversion
by other competing interests).
12. For a discussion of the impact of the antitrust state action doctrine upon
the states, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994) (providing that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States ... without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained .... ).
19971
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Part I of this Article briefly examines the development of the
law on state sovereign immunity by placing the Seminole Tribe deci-
sion in a historical perspective. 14 Part II then specifically examines
the Seminole Tribe decision, in which the historical minority judicial
interpretation concerning Congress's authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity now becomes the majority view. 15 Part III re-
views the antitrust state action doctrine, which has been developed
to immunize anticompetitive state and private actions that are ac-
tively supervised by a state and undertaken pursuant to a clearly
articulated state policy to supplant competition with regulation.1 6
Part III concludes that, while the underlying federalism rationale of
the state action doctrine is consistent with the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the antitrust doctrine inquires into whether the challenged
activity is truly the act of a sovereign, thereby balancing the goals of
promoting competition and respecting state sovereignty. Part IV
analyzes antitrust actions in which defendant states have sought
both antitrust state action immunity and Eleventh Amendment sov-
ereign immunity.1 7 Part IV finds that few cases have recognized the
distinctions between the two theories of sovereign immunity. Fi-
nally, Part V examines the potential effect of the Seminole Tribe deci-
sion on antitrust litigation and identifies the following two
changes.18 First, the Eleventh Amendment does not take into con-
sideration the value of competition, whereas the state action immu-
nity defense allows courts to balance the goal of competition
against deference to a state acting as a sovereign. Second, the more
limited state action defense will now only apply to private actors in
antitrust cases while the broader Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity will apply to states as an absolute bar to any suit for anti-
trust liability.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY UNDER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The power of the federal courts is derived from Article III of
the United States Constitution, which extends the federal judicial
14. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity, see infra notes 19-94 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Seminole Tibe decision, see infra notes 95-166 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the antitrust state action doctrine and its consistency
with the Eleventh Amendment, see infra notes 167-259 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the Eleventh Amendment and the state action defenses
in antitrust cases, see infra notes 260-340 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of Seminole Tribe on antitrust theory and
practice, see infra notes 341-65 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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power to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority" and to controversies "be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State," among other things. 19
While state sovereign immunity might have been an intended con-
cept in the original framing of the Constitution, Article III does not
specifically refer to the sovereign immunity of states from suit in
federal court.
In defining the extent of sovereign immunity to be afforded to
the newly-formed states, the Framers of the Constitution had a vari-
ety of options: abrogating any and all sovereign immunity that was
possessed by the Colonies before the adoption of the Constitution,
recognizing sovereign immunity but authorizing the newly-formed
Congress or its successors to abrogate that immunity, or adopting
sovereign immunity as an absolute bar to suits against states in fed-
eral courts.20 The majority in Seminole Tribe found that Congress
had chosen the third option of sovereign immunity as an absolute
bar, while the dissenters found no consensus among the Framers as
to the issue of sovereign immunity.2 1 This historical debate was a
critical question in Seminole Tribe, and its resolution will impact
cases brought under the antitrust laws and other federal statutes
that are enforceable exclusively in federal court.
A. The Chisholm Decision
The development of the principles of state sovereign immunity
by the United States Supreme Court has been long and conten-
tious. Initially, the Court held in Chisholm v. Georgia22 that states
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
20. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1147 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (" [T] he 1787 Constitution might have addressed state sovereign immu-
nity by eliminating whatever sovereign immunity the states previously had .... by
recognizing an analogue to the old immunity in the new context of federal juris-
diction . . .or by enshrining a doctrine of inviolable state sovereign immunity
.... .).
21. Id. The prevailing post-Seminole Tribe view, therefore, is that an under-
standing of the meaning of sovereign immunity existed before the Constitution
was adopted and that such an understanding was subsumed, sub silentio, into the
Constitution. See generally id. at 1130 (explaining concept of sovereign immunity
was preexisting and was adopted by Constitution). The competing view, now the
minority, finds no compelling evidence of a common understanding about sover-
eign immunity or that any understanding was part of the Constitution. Id. at 1147.
It is sufficient to note that the documentary evidence is at least equivocal.
22. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (assumpsit action brought by South Carolina
residents against State of Georgia).
1997]
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were not immune from suits by noncitizens.23 Thus, at a minimum,
shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, the federal courts
had diversity jurisdiction in suits brought by citizens of one state
against other states.2 4
The Eleventh Amendment, adopted in 1798, after the Chisholm
decision, clearly limits the power of the federal courts with respect
to states, although the reasons for its adoption have been dis-
puted.2 5 The Amendment simply states that: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
23. See id. at 425 (holding that there would "be no degradation of sovereignty,
in the States, to submit [noncitizen suits against a state] to the Supreme Judiciary
of the United States"). In justice Blair's view, in adopting the Constitution, the
states gave up any sovereign immunity they possessed before its adoption. Id. at
451. Justice Wilson, after discussing the general history of sovereign immunity,
viewed the people of the United States, not the individual state entities, as the
sovereigns. Id. at 455. He pointed to the plain language of the Constitution,
which extended the judicial power of the federal courts to suits against states by
noncitizens. Id. at 466. Justice Cushing shared Justice Wilson's views, pointing to
the "letter of the Constitution" and observing that a contrary result "might tend
gradually to involve states in war and bloodshed, a disinterested civil tribunal was
intended to be instituted to decide such controversies, and preserve peace and
friendship." Id. at 467-68. Chief Justice Jay believed that "at the Revolution, the
sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the coun-
try." Id. at 471. The states, as agents of the people, were subject to suit. Id. at 471-
73. Chief Justice Jay also agreed that the plain language of the Constitution con-
templated diversity suits against states in federal court. Id. at 476-77. He con-
cluded that "[t] he extension of the judiciary power of the United States to such
controversies [between states and noncitizens], appears ... to be wise, because it is
honest, and because it is useful." Id. at 479.
24. See id. at 479 (holding federal courts had diversity jurisdiction). OnlyJus-
tice Iredell dissented. Id. at 429 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Surveying the English
common law history of sovereign immunity, he concluded that the common law
precluded suits against nonconsenting sovereigns. Id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissent-
ing). Similarly, before the adoption of the Constitution, the common law of the
various Colonies did not allow suits against nonconsenting sovereigns. Id. (Iredell,
J., dissenting). Because Justice Iredell concluded that the Constitution created no
new remedies, no action could be maintained by a noncitizen against a state. Id. at
436 (Iredell, J., dissenting). He stated:
I have now, I think, established the following particulars. -st. That the
Constitution so far as it respects the judicial authority, can only be carried
into effect by acts of the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescribing
their methods of proceeding.
-2d. That Congress has provided no new law in regard to this case, but
expressly referred us to the old.
-3d. That there are no principles of the old law, to which we must have
recourse, that in any manner authorize the present suit, either by prece-
dent or by analogy.
Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
25. SeeJohn J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. Rv. 1889, 1926-39 (1983) (reviewing timetable and
varieties in language of proposed resolutions introduced in several early sessions of
Congress). A version of the Eleventh Amendment was introduced only days after
the Chisholm decision, but no action was taken on it for two years. Id.
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."26
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies exclusively to
"States." As a threshold matter, then, if the Eleventh Amendment is
inapplicable to any entity other than one of the states, federal
courts should mechanically review pleadings and dismiss all claims
that are brought by noncitizens of a state naming that state as a
defendant. Such a narrow reading of the rule, however, would put
a premium on clever pleading and could easily frustrate the intent
of the Amendment.27 Indeed, this is not the rule. The Court has
recognized that the entities entitled to the protection of the Elev-
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
27. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurispru-
dence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of
Action over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 663
(1988) (suggesting technicalities of pleading can be important when plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief against state official under Ex parte Young doctrine). In Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that a suit naming only a state
official, and not the state itself, would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 155-56 ("[I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, . . . threaten . . . to
enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act .... may be enjoined by a
Federal court of equity from such action."). While Young, in effect, created a legal
fiction, it has been recognized as a necessary tool in vindicating federal rights and
holding state officials "to the supreme authority of the United States." Harris &
Kenny, supra, at 661-62. Thus, the Ex parte Young doctrine works to avoid the frus-
trations that a narrow reading of the Eleventh Amendment could create in regard
to technical pleading limitations. Harris and Kenny noted:
For example, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against a state agency
must name as the party defendant the state official and not the state
agency, because an injunctive action against a state agency is barred by
the [E]leventh [A]mendment. Such a pleading requirement manifestly
exalts form over substance, because any relief granted by a court will obvi-
ously operate against a state agency.
Id. at 663 (footnotes omitted).
9
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enth Amendment include both states and their agencies. 28 The
same rule applies to suits for damages 29 and injunctive relief.30
Courts and commentators have described the Eleventh
Amendment as having been adopted to explicitly reverse the
Chisholm decision.31 Whether Congress intended the Amendment
to be limited solely to diversity cases brought by citizens of one state
against a foreign state, as in Chisholm, has been debated by courts
and commentators ever since the Chisholm decision was first ren-
dered.3 2 Nearly 100 years after the Amendment was adopted, the
Supreme Court declared that Chisholm had "created such a shock of
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Con-
28. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)
(holding suit against Indiana's Treasury Department to be barred by Eleventh
Amendment). But see Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't Co., 377
U.S. 184, 185 (1964) (holding state immunity may be waived by showing congres-
sional intent to do so), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Hwy. & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (holding that "to the extent that Parden... is
inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably clear language, it is over-
ruled"). In Parden, the plaintiffs sued the railway, which was owned and operated
by a state agency, for violating the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Id. at
184 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60). The State defended on the Eleventh Amendment
ground that the railroad was a state agency, and the State had not consented to be
sued. Id. at 185. The Supreme Court found that Congress intended to subject all
railroad operators to FELA and that the states had waived some of their own sover-
eign immunity through the adoption of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 187-92. The
Welch decision overruled Parden in part by requiring a clear and unmistakable ex-
pression by Congress rather than by showing a mere Congressional intent to waive
state immunity. Welchk 483 U.S. at 478; see also Harris & Kenny, supra note 27, at
663 & n.78 (explaining how Eleventh Amendment applies to state agencies and
state officials in their official capacities).
29. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464 (" [W] hen the action is in essence one for
the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though
individual officials are nominal defendants.").
30. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (denying injunction on
ground that Eleventh Amendment immunized Alabama Board of Correction from
suit). In Pugh, both the State and its Board of Corrections sought dismissal of
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for injunctions concerning conditions
in the Alabama prisons pursuant to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Id.
at 781. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that "[t]here can be no doubt... that
suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to the filing of such a suit." Id. at 782.
31. See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325-26 (1934)
(describing Eleventh Amendment as being adopted to reverse result of Chisholm);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (same). The shock and surprise created
by Chisholm prompted an almost immediate reaction, as the Eleventh Amendment
was nearly unanimously adopted by Congress and subsequently approved by the
state legislatures. Id.
32. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1473-75 (1987) (describing debate over congressional intent of Eleventh
Amendment to limit citizen suits against states).
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gress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was
almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by
the legislatures of the States." 33 Indeed, at least one version of the
Amendment was introduced in the second session of Congress, two
days after the Supreme Court decided Chisholm in 1793.34 Con-
gress, however, adjourned without adopting the resolution.3 5 It was
not until the third session of Congress that several resolutions em-
bodying various versions of what is now the Eleventh Amendment
were introduced and, in due course, one was adopted.3 6 The ver-
sion ultimately adopted was passed by both the Senate and the
House, and was then sent to the states for ratification in 1794, two
years after Chisholm.37
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment appears to deal only with
the specific issue in Chisholm, which Congress apparently perceived
to be a problem-that is, the ability of citizens of one state to bring
suit in federal court against another state pursuant to the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts.38 Just as clearly, the Amendment
does not, on its face, limit federal court jurisdiction over states in
federal question cases brought under the Constitution or federal
laws.39 The debatable issue after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, therefore, was whether the Amendment merely elimi-
nated federal diversity jurisdiction in cases against states, or
whether it went further and eliminated all federal court jurisdiction
33. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
34. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1926-27.
35. Id. at 1927.
36. Id. at 1932-34.
37. Id. at 1933-34.
38. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 44-46 (1988) (stating that Eleventh Amendment
was directed at diversity cases involving state defendants and not at federal ques-
tion cases). According to Jackson, Chisholm "was a state law claim, presenting no
substantive federal issues. Original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was sus-
tained solely on the basis of the state-citizen clause. Because the perception that
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be divested by statute, a
constitutional amendment was thought necessary to overcome Chisholm's effect."
Id. at 45. Moreover, "the amendment was widely supported in Congress by federal-
ists and non-federalists alike." Id. at 46.
39. See Gibbons, supra note 25, at 1927, 1934-38 (asserting that plain language
of Eleventh Amendment alters only Article III party status but does not affect Arti-
cle III subject matterjurisdiction). One commentator has persuasively pointed out
that if Congress had intended to strip federal courts of all jurisdiction over states,
the last 14 words of the Eleventh Amendment would have been omitted, leaving
the Amendment to read simply: "The judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States." Id. at 1927.
1997]
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over states in actions brought by citizens of foreign states, whether
brought under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 40
B. The Hans Decision
A century after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Supreme Court, in Hans v. Louisiana,41 assumed that the Amend-
ment applied to federal question cases, as well as diversity cases,
brought against a state by citizens of a foreign state. 42 Accordingly,
the Court decided that states must also be immune from federal
question suits brought by their own citizens, because a contrary rule
would permit the anomalous result of prohibiting suits against
states strictly based upon the plaintiff's citizenship. Thus, suits
based upon federal questions brought by noncitizens would be dis-
missed while the same suits brought by a state's own citizens would
be allowed.43
In so holding, Hans decided a different question from that ar-
ticulated in Chisholm: "whether a State can be sued in a circuit court
of the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion
40. See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1150-51 (1996)
(Souter,J., dissenting) (discussing debate over scope of Eleventh Amendment). In
a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter characterized the majority of scholarly opinion
as taking the view that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted to provide immunity
in diversity cases. Id. at 1150-51 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting). Moreover, the
broader reading of the Amendment leaves a loophole-federal question cases
brought by citizens against their own states. Id. at 1150-51 (Souter,J., dissenting).
Seminole Tribe itself involved a suit by Florida citizens against their own state.
41. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
42. See id. at 10-21 (allowing Louisiana citizen to sue Louisiana, asserting that
state's default on its bonds, issued during Reconstruction, violated Contract Clause
of Constitution).
43. Id. at 10, 14-15. The Seminole Tribe dissenters and commentators have criti-
cized the Hans decision as having been decided incorrectly. See Seminole Tribe, 116
S. Ct. at 1153-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing Hans as "creat[ing] its own
anomaly in leaving federal courts entirely without jurisdiction to enforce para-
mount federal law at the behest of a citizen against a State that broke it"). Indeed,
commentators discussing the historical setting of the Hans decision have observed
that it may have been influenced by other political considerations-enforcing an
adverse judgment against an unwilling state. See Gibbons, supra note 25, at 2000-01
(noting that Hans Court was silent as to other political considerations, but lower
courts recognized possible difficulty in coercing states to comply with adverse judg-
ments); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 HARv. L. REy. 61, 70 (1984) (recognizing that "efforts to coerce the states
to pay their debts would prove unenforceable"). In fact, Justice Souter noted that
federal troops were removed from the South pursuant to the Compromise of 1877
in return for Southern concurrence in the 1876 election of President Rutherford
B. Hayes. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1155 (Souter,J., dissenting). Furthermore,
he observed that this probably would have left the federal government unable to
enforce any court-ordered relief against hostile Southern states, including a judg-
ment on a bond such as Hans sought. Id.
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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that the case is one that arises under the Constitution or laws of the
United States."44 In Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued the State of Lou-
isiana in federal court alleging that the State's failure to pay the
principal and interest on state-issued bonds violated Article I, Sec-
tion 10 of the Constitution, the Contract Clause. 45 Thus, on its
face, Hans appears to present a different issue from that decided in
Chisholm-one that would not appear to be controlled by the lan-
guage of the Eleventh Amendment limitations on federal judicial
power for two reasons. 46 First, the Hans plaintiff was a citizen of
Louisiana suing his own state, and second, the federal court's juris-
diction was based on federal question rather than diversity jurisdic-
tion.47 In Hans, the Court first recognized that the language of the
Eleventh Amendment had eliminated federal diversity jurisdiction
in cases between states and noncitizens.4a Justice Bradley, writing
for the Hans Court, concluded that the Eleventh Amendment also
barred federal jurisdiction in cases involving federal question
claims against states by noncitizens. 49 Therefore, he felt an "anom-
alous result" would occur if a citizen could sue his or her own state
in federal court on a federal question but a noncitizen could not
sue that state in federal court on the same federal question.50 Jus-
tice Bradley agreed with Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm by hold-
ing that the Constitution did not intend to enlarge the power of the
federal judiciary or create remedies that had not existed at com-
mon law.51 Citing to The Federalist Papers and various debates at the
time of the proposed Constitution, Justice Bradley found that
under the common law as it existed in the Colonies before the
adoption of the Constitution, sovereign states could not be sued
without their consent. 52 Thus, Justice Bradley concluded that in
44. Hans, 134 U.S. at 9.
45. See id. at 1-3 (explaining facts of case).
46. Id.
47. Id. Both federal question and diversity jurisdiction are derived from Arti-
cle III, section 2 of the Constitution. The former is described as "Et]he judicial
power [that] shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Diversity jurisdiction
includes "[ciontraversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citi-
zens of another State;-between Citizens of different States .... Id.
48. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10 (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment literally
only prohibits noncitizen suits against states).
49. See id. (finding "that a State cannot be sued by a citizen of another State,
... on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States, is clearly established").
50. Id.
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 12-14.
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embodying the common law understanding, the Constitution never
authorized suits against sovereign states without their consent.58
This reading lessens the significance of the Eleventh Amendment
by transforming it into simply a tool to reverse Chisholm and not an
alteration of the original power of the judiciary.54 The Hans deci-
sion has been criticized but never reversed. 55
53. See id. at 15 ("The supposition that [the Eleventh Amendment would al-
low states to be sued without their consent] is almost an absurdity on its face.").
Relying on Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, Justice Bradley argued that suits
against the sovereign were unheard of at common law. Id. at 12-14; see Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (stating that suits against sovereign did
not exist in England or at time of first American settlements). Furthermore, Jus-
tice Bradley relied on statements of such founding fathers as Alexander Hamilton,
George Mason, Patrick Henry and James Madison to show that suits against the
sovereign were not contemplated in the constitutional framework. Hans, 134 U.S.
at 13-14.
54. See Amar, supra note 32, at 1475 (criticizing Court's interpretation that
Eleventh Amendment's purpose was to secure general immunity for states). In the
words of one commentator:
The Court's decision in Chisholm provoked a chorus of calls around the
country for a constitutional amendment. The text eventually agreed
upon ... was undeniably designed to repudiate the majority analysis in
Chisholm and overrule its holding. From that simple starting point, the
Supreme Court has arrived at the following interpretation of the case and
the Amendment: The defect of Chisholm was its failure to recognize abso-
lute state sovereign immunity from citizen suits in all circumstances, and
this defect was corrected by enshrining such immunity in the Constitu-
tion. No individual can sue her own or any other state in federal court
unless the defendant's constitutional immunity is in some special way
waived or abrogated. Sovereign immunity ousts all federal jurisdiction,
whether in law, equity, or admiralty; whether the suit is based on state
law, congressional statute, or the Constitution itself; and whether or not
state liability would most fully remedy a constitutional wrong perpetrated
by the state itself. The state thus enjoys sovereign immunity even when it
has violated a limitation on that sovereignty imposed by the ultimate sov-
ereign, the American People.
All of this is, in a word, nonsense.
Id. at 1473.
55. See id. at 1473-81 (asserting that Hans achieved general state sovereign
immunity "only by mangling the [Eleventh] Amendment's text"); Gibbons, supra
note 25, at 2003-04 (observing that Hans was "statesmanlike performance" in Elev-
enth Amendment analysis, which is "in large measure an unflinchingly political
one" because decision made pragmatic sense although lower court had little power
to enforce any judgment against southern state that had decided to repudiate its
bonds in that post-Civil War era);Jackson, supra note 38, at 13 ("These inconsisten-
cies have led many to conclude that the Hans Court was in error in its apparent
view that the judicial power of the federal courts did not extend to federal claims
against states."); Shapiro, supra note 43, at 70 ("Regardless of its possible political
justifications, the rationale of Hans v. Louisiana... should be regarded as an un-
forced error-a choice that was neither required nor fruitful.").
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C. Modern Eleventh Amendment Analysis
After Hans, the final issue remaining open was whether Con-
gress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. If the Hans ra-
tionale was based upon constitutional grounds, then Congress
lacked the power to abrogate the states' immunity. If the decision
was based upon common law, then the Congress had such power.
Two cases have implied in dicta that Congress did have that power
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In Parden v. Ter-
minal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department,56 the Court held the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) was applicable to a rail-
road that was operated by a department of the state. 57 The State
argued that it was immune from suit58 because it had not waived its
sovereign immunity. 59 The Court found that Congress had in-
56. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highway
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). For a discussion of how the Welch decision
impacted the Parden decision, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
57. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187-90 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60).
58. Id. at 185-86. The Supreme Court recognized that the strict language of
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply because the action was brought against
Alabama by its own citizens, but that the Hans doctrine recognized that an uncon-
senting state possesses sovereign immunity from suits brought by its citizens. Id. at
186.
59. Id. The Court stated that sovereign "immunity may of course be waived;
the State's freedom from suit without its consent does not protect it from a suit to
which it has consented." Id. This particular rule is found in early Eleventh
Amendment decisions. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883)
(holding state not protected from suit to which it has consented); see alsoJackson,
supra note 38, at 12 ("Even disfavored forms of relief... can be granted if the state
consents to suit in federal court."). The logic of this rule, however, has been ques-
tioned. If the Eleventh Amendment, including the Hans doctrine, stands for the
proposition that federal courts lack the power to exercise jurisdiction over states,
meaning that they lack jurisdiction, then any consent of a state to suit is irrelevant.
See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 n.10 (1973) (Marshall,J., concurring) (recognizing
jurisdictional problem). In Employees of Department of Public Health and Welfare, the
majority noted that the dissent believed "that recognition of a State's power to
consent to suit in federal court is inconsistent with any view that the impediment
to private federal court suits against a State has constitutional roots in the limited
nature of the federal judicial power." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). The majority
apparently conceded that this view is correct. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Marshall stated:
[A]s a rule, the power to hear an action cannot be conferred on a federal
court by consent. And, it may be that the recognized power of States to
consent to the exercise of federal judicial power over them is anomalous
in light of present-day concepts of federal jurisdiction. Yet, if this is the
case, it is an anomaly that is well established as a part of our constitutional
jurisprudence.
Id. (Marshall,J., concurring). In response, the dissent retorted that."if Art. III is an
absolute jurisdictional bar, my Brother Marshall is inconsistent in conceding that
federal courts have power to entertain suits by or against consenting States. For I
had always supposed that jurisdictional power to entertain a suit was not capable of
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tended to apply FELA to every employer, including states, 60 and
that Congress had the power to do so under the Commerce
Clause. 61 The Court's holding, however, was explicitly based on its
finding that the State had consented to suit.62 Similarly, in Employ-
ees of Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public
Health and Welfare,63 the same issue arose in the context of another
federal regulatory scheme enacted pursuant to Congress's power
waiver and could not be conferred by consent." Id. at 321 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
60. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 187 ("We think that Congress, in making the FELA
applicable to 'every' common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce, meant
what it said.").
61. See id. at 192 ("By empowering Congress to regulate commerce, then, the
States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in
the way of such regulation."). The dissent in Parden framed the issue in terms of
congressional power to require states to waive their sovereign immunity as part of
participating in a federally regulated activity, which must be done unequivocally.
Id. at 198-99. Thus, in his dissent, Justice White argued:
It should not be easily inferred that Congress, in legislating pursuant to
one article of the Constitution, intended to effect an automatic and com-
pulsory waiver of rights arising under another. Only when Congress has
clearly considered the problem and expressly declared that any State
which undertakes given regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to
have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this
defense.
Id. (White,J., dissenting). The majority, then, was of the view that Congress could
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 190-92. The dissent would reach the same result by a
different route-recognizing that Congress could legislate in a way that gave the
states a choice between waiving their immunity and enjoying federal benefits, or
maintaining their immunity at the expense of federal benefits. Id. at 198-99
(White, J., dissenting).
The Court's later decision in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public
Transportation partially overruled the Parden decision by requiring that any congres-
sional abrogation of the states' immunity be done by "unequivocal expression,"
rather than by implication through a mere judicial finding of such congressional
intent. See Welch, 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) ("Although our later decisions do not
expressly overrule Parden, they leave no doubt that Parden's discussion of Congres-
sional intent to negate Eleventh Amendment immunity is no longer good law.").
Thus, without such an unequivocal expression, congressional legislation enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause is not enough to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See id. (refusing to extend Parden in order to "'infer that Congress in legis-
lating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in
its applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long
enjoyed under another part of the Constitution."' (quoting Employees of Dep't of
Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. at 285)).
62. See id. at 192 (holding that Alabama's continued operation of railroad for
20 years after enactment of FELA was consent to suits authorized by FELA). The
Court confirmed this interpretation of the Parden holding in Employees of Department
of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), where it stated: "[T]here can be no doubt that the Court's holding in
Parden was premised on the conclusion that Alabama, by operating the railroad,
had consented to suit in the federal courts under FELA." Id. at 280 n.1.
63. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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under the Commerce Clause-the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which Congress also intended to apply to all employers. 64
The Court found, however, that applying FLSA to states as employ-
ers would include a vast number of people working for the states in
a variety of different jobs.65 In light of the significant impact of
subjecting states to suit in federal court under FLSA, and in the
absence of legislative history on the subject, the Court refused to
infer that Congress had intended to abrogate the immunity of the
states from suit.66 Thus, in refusing to lift state sovereign immunity
in the absence of a clear congressional intent to do so, the Court
implicitly recognized that Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity if it did so clearly and expressly. 67
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,68 the Court further found that Congress
had successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity, albeit pursu-
ant to the Fourteenth Amendment.69 In Fitzpatrick, the plaintiffs
64. See id. at 282-83 (citing sections of FLSA which impose liability on employ-
ers who violate provisions of this Act). In the Missouri case, state employees sued
for overtime pay as provided for and required by § 16 of FLSA. Id. at 281 (citing
29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The language of the FLSA includes states as covered employ-
ers with respect to certain classes of employees, specifically employees of "a hospi-
tal, institution, or [certain] school[s]." Id. at 282-83.
65. See id. at 284-85 (arguing that interpretation would place enormous fiscal
burdens on states). The Court found that applying FLSA to states as employers
would result in including not only employees of state hospitals, but also "elevator
operators, janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every
office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." Id. at 285.
66. See id. (concluding that states did not forfeit immunity). The Court stated
that:
It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its applications,
desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long en-
joyed under another part of the Constitution. Thus, we cannot conclude
that Congress conditioned the operation of these facilities on the forfei-
ture of immunity from suit in a federal forum.
Id.
67. See id. (refusing to deprive Missouri of constitutional immunity without
some indication by Congress in "clear language that the constitutional immunity
was swept away"). But see id. at 289 (Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that
Congress had intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting FLSA).
Although Justice Marshall surmised that states had forfeited their immunity under
the FLSA, he noted that Article III of the Constitution precludes suits against states
in federal courts. Id. at 282-94 (Marshall, J., concurring). States, however, may
consent to private suits against them in federal courts. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). In this case, Justice Marshall found that Missouri had not manifested
consent to federal suit by continuing to operate public hospitals after enactment of
the FLSA. Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted, however,
that absent state consent to federal suit, plaintiffs are permitted to pursue their
cause of action in state court. Id. at 297-98 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (unanimous decision).
69. See id. at 452 (finding that congressional intent to abrogate state immunity
was present).
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sued state officials alleging that the state retirement plan discrimi-
nated against them on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
and damages in the form of retroactive retirement benefits. 71 The
case involved a private suit against a state official for money dam-
ages to be paid from the state treasury, and as such was essentially
against the state itself. The Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to
which Congress enacted Title VII, clearly limits the authority of
states72 and authorizes Congress to pass legislation to enforce the
safeguards of due process and equal protection afforded under the
Amendment.73  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
changed the balance of power between the states and federal gov-
ernment, limiting some of the authority and immunities enjoyed by
the states.74 The Court had little difficulty in finding that the Four-
teenth Amendment clearly limits state sovereignty, and that legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to the congressional power of the
Fourteenth Amendment could and did abrogate state immunity.75
The Court next articulated the requirements for abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. The 5-4 decision in Atascadero State Hospi-
70. Id. at 448. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to
2000h-6, was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 447, 453. In Fitzpatrick, petitioners sued the State of
Connecticut and state officials on behalf of all present and retired state employees.
Id. at 448. The petitioners alleged that the state's statutory retirement benefit plan
discriminated against them on the basis of sex. Id.
71. Id. at 449-50.
72. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws" (emphasis added)).
73. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (providing that "[tihe Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
74. SeeExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880) ("Indeed, every addition
of power to the general government involves a corresponding diminution of the
governmental powers of the States."). In Ex parte Virginia, the Court stated that:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power... [b]ut the
Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference
and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of
cases; but within its limits it is complete.
Id. at 346-48.
75. See id. at 346 (reiterating that prohibitions of Fourteenth Amendment are
addressed to states); see also Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that, in adopting Commerce Clause, states gave up their sovereign immu-
nity and thus no state immunity was abrogated). Id. at 458 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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tal v. Scanlon7 6 has been characterized by commentators as includ-
ing "vigorous if not vitriolic dissents."77 In Atascadero, the plaintiff
sued a state hospital and the California Department of Mental
Health alleging employment discrimination under a federal stat-
ute.78 The state defendants claimed Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity.79 In reversing the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit by finding that such sovereign immunity had
been waived, the Court held that Congress could abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity but must do so clearly in the text of a federal stat-
ute.80 In the absence of such a clear statement, states and their
agencies are immune from damages in federal court for violation of
that law. 81
In the plurality opinion of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,8 2 the
Court appeared to answer the final open issue by holding that Con-
gress could abrogate state immunity in federal question cases based
upon statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. 83 The Court held that the Hans decision was
76. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
77. See Harris & Kenny, supra note 27, at 647 (stating that bare majority of
Atascadero Court held that "unconsenting states and state agencies are immune to
suits for money damages in federal court for violations of federal law, unless Con-
gress makes it unmistakably clear in the language of the statute itself that it intends
to abrogate the states' immunity").
78. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236 (citing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794). The plaintiff contended that his denial for employment was based
on his physical handicaps. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 238-40 ("As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the
States' consent.").
81. See id. at 238 n.1 (holding that "in absence of clear statement from Con-
gress, States are immune unless there is unequivocal indication that the State in-
tends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment"); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)
(holding that state may only waive immunity through express language or over-
whelming implication that does not allow any other interpretation because
"[c] onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender
of constitutional rights").
82. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996).
83. See id. at 23 ("We hold that . . . Congress has the authority to render
[States] ... liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause."). In Union
Gas, the operators of a coal gasification plant had produced and disposed of coal
tar, a hazardous substance, near a creek in Pennsylvania. Id. at 5. In the course of
a state flood control project, the State of Pennsylvania obtained easements to the
land. Id. During the excavation of the creek, state workers struck a coal tar de-
posit, which then seeped into the creek. Id. at 5-6. After the site was declared the
Nation's first emergency Superfund site, the state assisted with the clean-up and
was reimbursed by the federal government. Id. The United States then sued
Union Gas, the successor company to the original operator, for the dean-up costs.
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not based upon a constitutional doctrine but was merely a statutory
interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1875.84 This case illuminates
the delicacy of achieving a proper balance of power between state
and federal levels of government as well as between state sovereign
immunity and injured private entities. The majority found, first,
that Congress had shown an "unmistakably clear" intent to abrogate
state sovereign immunity from damages in enacting the environ-
mental laws at issue in the case.85 Similar to the creation of anti-
trust law, the environmental laws involved in Union Gas were
enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, not under the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6 Justice Brennan,
Id. at 6. Union Gas then filed a third party complaint against the state, claiming
that Pennsylvania had been an "owner or operator" of a hazardous waste site and
thus was liable for part of the clean-up costs. Id. The district court dismissed the
complaint by holding that the suit against Pennsylvania was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. The Third Circuit then affirmed. Id. While Union Gas's peti-
tion for certiorari was pending, Congress amended the federal environmental laws
which "clearly rendered States liable for monetary damages." Id. After the Court
remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the
Court held that the amended language used by Congress had abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity. Id. at 23.
84. See id. at 19 (refuting Justice Scalia's dissenting argument that Hans deci-
sion answered question of whether Congress has authority to abrogate state's im-
munity when legislating pursuant to Constitution). The Judiciary Act of 1875,
according to the Union Gas majority, was necessary to enable federal question cases
because Article III was not self-executing. Id. Although Article III did not clearly
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the majority apparently believed that it could
have done so. Id. Similarly, the Judiciary Act could have abrogated state sovereign
immunity, but it did not. See generally id. (recognizing that "if Article III did not
'automatically eliminate' sovereign immunity, then neither did the Judiciary Act of
1875"). The subsequent decision in Seminole Tribe overruled Union Gas and
adopted precisely the opposite rule by finding that state sovereign immunity in
federal question, as well as diversity, cases is part of the Constitution and cannot be
abrogated by Congress. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (reasoning that "both
the result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our established
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment").
85. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 10 (finding that "Congress must have intended
to override the States' immunity from suit"). The Court held that the "language of
CERCLA as amended by SARA clearly evidences an intent to hold states liable in
damages in federal courts." Id. at 7, 12-13 (citing The Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(21), 9607 (a) (1994) (describing "persons" who may be liable under CER-
CLA as including "states"); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994) (stating that "State(s) ... shall be
subject to ... liability under [CERCLA] section 9607")). The Court found that
"[slection 101(20) (D) is an express acknowledgment of Congress' background un-
derstanding ... that States would be liable." Id. at 8. The requirement of a clear
congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity is required under Atascadero.
Id. at 242 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)). For a
discussion of Atascadero, see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
86. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5 (indicating that Congress was legislating pur-
suant to Commerce Clause when it enacted CERCLA and SARA).
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writing for the majority, reiterated the statements made in earlier
cases suggesting that the states had surrendered some of their sov-
ereignty when they adopted the Constitution and authorized Con-
gress to regulate commerce under the Commerce Clause.8 7
Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, Congress had the power
under the Commerce Clause to abrogate sovereign immunity and
subject states to suits in federal court.88
Finally, the Court in Ex parte Young89 held that federal courts
have jurisdiction prospectively to enjoin state officials to comply
with federal law, even in situations where the state itself is immune
from suit.90 If compliance with such federal obligations requires
the state to spend money, it must do so.91 The Ex parte Young doc-
trine, however, does not authorize the federal court to order money
damages. 92 The doctrine employs a legal fiction of avoiding suit
87. See id. at 14 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184, 191 (1964), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Hwys. & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973)) (concluding that
review of prior cases suggests that Congress may permit suits against states due to
surrender of portion of state sovereignty through grant of authority to Congress to
regulate commerce).
88. See id. at 19, 23 (holding "Congress has the authority to override States'
immunity when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause"). This section of
Justice Brennan's opinion dealing with the question of whether the Commerce
Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate states' immunity was joined only by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 5. In concurrence, Justice White
agreed that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity if it did so explic-
itly, but concluded that it had not done so with respect to the federal statutes at
issue in the case. Id. at 45 (White, J., concurring).
89. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
90. See id. at 158-59. The Court reasoned that a state official lacks any official
authority to violate federal law or the Constitution, so the illegal acts challenged
are, in effect, not the acts of the state. Id. at 159-60. Accordingly, neither the
Eleventh Amendment nor any other principle of sovereign immunity are im-
pacted. Id. The state officer's actions are "simply an illegal act upon the part of a
state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legisla-
tive enactment which is void because unconstitutional." Id. at 159.
91. See Miliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977) (holding that federal obli-"
gations required money from Michigan treasury to fund desegregation of public
education system). The decree to share the future costs of desegregating the pub-
lic school system was found by the Miliken Court to fall within the "prospective-
compliance exception .... which had its genesis in Ex parte Young." Id. The Court
stated that Young permitted "federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform
their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct substantial
impact on the state treasury." Id.
92. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1182 (1996) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) ("Young does not provide retrospective monetary relief but allows pro-
spective enforcement of federal law that is entitled to prevail under the Supremacy
Clause. It requires ... lawful conduct by a public employee acting in his official
capacity."); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974) ("We do not read Ex parte
Young... to indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer,
1997]
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against a state by suing only a state official. The doctrine creates
the fiction that no state official has the authority to violate the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States and any official who does so is
acting ultra vires and not legitimately on behalf of the state at all.93
Thus, a suit against such an official is not a suit against the state that
would be prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment and the Hans
doctrine.94
II. THE SEMINOLE TRIBE DECISION-THE ASCENT
OF THE MINORITY
Seminole Tribe is about "power," not in the antitrust sense of
market power,95 but rather "the power of the Congress of the
United States to create a private federal cause of action against a
State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal right."96 In de-
ciding Seminole Tribe,97 the Court did more than determine the obli-
gation of a state to negotiate with an Indian tribe under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act ("the Act" or "the Indian Gaming Act");98 it
no matter how closely it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out
of the state treasury, so long as the relief may be labeled 'equitable."').
93. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167 (holding that officer's act
under state immunity will not protect officer from personal liability).
94. See id. at 184 (recognizing that in some cases "the defendant 'is not sued
as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an individual, and the court
is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts authority as such officer"' (quoting
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1983))).
95. See Department ofJustice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at S-3 (Apr. 2, 1992) (explaining that
unifying theme of Guidelines is "that mergers should not be permitted to create or
enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise"). Market power "is the ability
[of a seller] profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant
period of time [or to decrease competition in other areas such as quality, service or
innovation]." Id. at S-3 & n.6. Thus, market power allows firms to raise or main-
tain prices above competitive levels, or to prevent already high prices from decreas-
ing to competitive levels, or to restrict output or limit new entry. See Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984) (stating that "market
power exists whenever prices can be raised above the levels that would be charged
in a competitive market"); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966) (defining "market power" as power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion); Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Association of Attorneys General, 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at S-3 n.8 (Special Supp. Apr. 1, 1993) ("Mar-
ket power is the ability of one or more firms to maintain prices above a competitive
level, or to prevent prices from decreasing to a lower competitive level, or to limit
output or entry.").
96. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1114. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and was joined
by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 1119. Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in filing a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
at 1145 (Souter,J., dissenting).
98. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
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announced a major development in the law of state sovereign im-
munity, as the minority view of Union Gas became the majority view
of Seminole Tribe.
A. Factual Background
The Indian Gaming Act ("Act") was enacted pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause, which is a section of the Commerce
Clause delegating to Congress the power "lt] o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."99 The Act pervasively regulates the manner in which
gaming can be developed and carried out on Indian lands by divid-
ing the types of gaming into three categories or classes; 100 the third
class is the most heavily regulated and was the subject of Seminole
Tribe.1° 1 The Act provides that class III gaming is legal only in lim-
ited circumstances and must be "conducted in conformance with a
Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the
State."102 The compacts between Indian tribes and states, as de-
scribed in the Act, are required to be the result of good faith nego-
tiations between the respective state and the Indian tribe.1 03
Further, the statute specifically authorizes the Indian tribe to sue
any state to enforce the provisions of the Act.' 0 4 Lastly, the Act cre-
ates a federal remedy in federal court for failure of a state to negoti-
ate in good faith.10 5
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(18). Class I gaming means "social games solely for
prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by indi-
viduals as a part of or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id.
§ 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo and games similar to bingo, such as
"pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, [and] instant bingo." Id. § 2703(7). Bank-
ing card games, electronic games of choice and slot machines are expressly ex-
cluded from class II. Id. Finally, the Act defines class III gaming as "all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming." Id. § 2703(8).
101. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1119 (stating that court is concerned with
class III gaming which "includes such things as slot machines, casino games, bank-
ing card games, dog racing, and lotteries" (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1994))).
102. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Further, to ensure the legality of class III gam-
ing, the governing body of the tribe must adopt a resolution or ordinance author-
izing the gambling, gain approval by the National Indian Gaming Commission,
comply with all other statutory requirements, and be in a state that permits gam-
bling. Id.
103. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (requiring state to "negotiate with Indian
tribe in good faith to enter into [a Tribal-State] compact").
104. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (ii) (stating that Indian tribe may initiate
cause of action to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of Tribal-State
compact entered into pursuant to Act).
105. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A)-(D) (9) (granting federal jurisdiction over
several causes of action relating to Act). The Act provides that: "The United States
district courts shall have jurisdiction over - (i) any cause of action initiated by an
1997]'
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The regulatory scheme and statutory remedies of the Indian
Gaming Act are significantly more complex and all-encompassing
than the federal antitrust laws, which simply declare certain re-
straints of trade unlawful 10 6 and provide for exclusive federal juris-
diction to enforce such laws. 107 Certain sections of the modern
antitrust laws, however, spell out detailed procedures and remedies
in particular situations, such as pre-merger review by federal en-
forcement agencies of proposed business acquisitions above a cer-
tain size and public notice and comment for settlements of
Department of Justice cases.10 8
The comprehensive statutory scheme of the Indian Gaming
Act, contemplating litigation against states in federal courts, put in
place the framework for a decision that will affect federal-state rela-
tions in a variety of federal questions, including antitrust, bank-
ruptcy, copyright and environmental law. The Seminole Tribe case
arose from the failed efforts of the Seminole Tribe to negotiate a
compact with the State of Florida. In 1991, the tribe sued the State
and its Governor, Lawton Chiles, alleging that they had failed to
negotiate a compact for gambling with the tribe, which constituted
a violation of the good faith negotiation requirement. 10 9 Florida
moved to dismiss the complaint based upon sovereign immunity
Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the
Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact ...or to
conduct such negotiations in good faith ...." Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A).
106. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (declaring "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
... to be illegal"), and 15 U.S.C. § 2 (defining "[e]very person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States... [to] be deemed guilty of a felony... "), with 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (creating
pervasive statutory scheme which provides Indian tribes "exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity" in order to promote tribal economic activity, self sufficiency and
self-government).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (mandating that "the several district courts of the United
States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of ... this
[Act]").
108. See, e.g., The Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (stating that final judgment
rendered in any proceeding initiated by United States under antitrust laws "to the
effect that a defendant had violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence" against
such defendant in any other proceeding brought under antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)-(d) (describing procedures for public notice and comment on consent
judgments); 15 U.S.C. § 18a (describing procedures for pre-merger notification
and waiting period).
109. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1996) (noting that
complaint alleged that State "refused to enter into any negotiations for inclusion
of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state compact").
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because it had not consented to the suit.1 10 The District Court de-
nied the State's motion to dismiss.11 On interlocutory appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit
against the State and its governor. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed and remanded the case to be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 112
B. Supreme Court's Majority Holding and Analysis
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1)
whether Congress is prevented from authorizing suits against states
for injunctions to enforce federal legislation enacted pursuant to
the Indian Commerce Clause and (2) whether the Ex parte Young
doctrine authorizes lawsuits against the state governor for injunc-
tive relief to compel the negotiations required by the federal legisla-
tion. 113 The majority of the Court answered the first question in
the affirmative and the second question in the negative. First, the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suits against states; and second, that the Ex parte Young
doctrine does not allow litigation against state officials to enforce
the terms of this particular federal legislation. 14
110. Id. The state argued it had sovereign immunity from suits in federal
court. Id.
111. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 663 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd,
11 F.3d 1016 (l1th Cir. 1994).
112. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Un-
less one of the three exceptions-consent, abrogation, or Ex parte Young-applies,
the Eleventh Amendment serves as ajurisdictional bar and precludes federal court
adjudication over these suits."), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). Further, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that Ex parte Young did not authorize the plaintiff Indian tribe to
compel negotiations between the state and the tribe. Id. at 1028 (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Seminole Tribewas consolidated in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit with an Alabama case that reached a different conclusion on whether Con-
gress was authorized by the Constitution to abrogate the states' immunity. Id. at
1018 (consolidating Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550
(S.D. Ala. 1991), affid, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affid, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)).
In Poarch Band, the court granted the state of Alabama's motion to dismiss, hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits against the state. Poarch Band,
776 F. Supp. at 563. Shortly after the court granted the state's motion to dismiss,
the governor of Alabama filed his own motion to dismiss, which the court granted
in a separate action incorporating its previous order of dismissal. See Poarch Band
of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1550 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (holding
that assertion of jurisdiction over governor would violate Eleventh Amendment),
affd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
113. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
114. See id. at 1122, 1133 (affirming Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's
suit).
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The petitioner, Seminole Tribe, argued that by enacting the
Indian Gaming Act, Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which thus allowed the State of Florida to
be sued.115 The majority considered "first, whether Congress ha[d]
'unequivocally express[ed] its intent to abrogate the immunity,'...
and second, whether Congress ha[d] acted 'pursuant to a valid ex-
ercise of power."' 116 The Court ultimately decided that, although
the answer to the first issue was in the affirmative, 1 7 the issue was
irrelevant because Congress lacked any such power.118
1. Congressional Purpose to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity
Heretofore, in order to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
Congress was first required to make a clear and unequivocal state-
ment of congressional purpose. 19 In Seminole Tribe, the majority
agreed that there was such a requisite clear statement. 2 0 The anti-
trust laws, on the other hand, are not as clear. Similar to the Indian
Gaming Act, the Clayton Act specifically authorizes federal courts
to enforce the substantive provisions of the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts.12' These antitrust laws do not contain such a clear
statement of intent to subject states to federal courtjurisdiction and
115. Id. at 1123.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1123-24 ("[W]e agree with ... virtually every other court that
has confronted the question that Congress has . . .provided an 'unmistakably
clear' statement of its intent to abrogate.").
118. See id. at 1131-32 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress com-
plete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment pre-
vents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
states.").
119. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985) (re-
quiring "'an unequivocal expression of congressional intent"' to abrogate states'
constitutionally protected immunity (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984))). But see Cousins v. Dole, 674 F. Supp. 360,
362 n.6 (D. Me. 1987) (stating that in response to Atascadero, Congress amended
legislation at issue to "include the necessary language explicitly abrogating state
sovereign immunity").
120. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124 (finding "unmistakably clear" state-
ment of Congress's intent to abrogate). The Indian Gaming Act authorizes suit by
an Indian tribe in the United States District Court for any cause of action concern-
ing a failure by a state to negotiate, in good faith or at all, with an Indian tribe on
the subject of a gaming compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) (1994 & Supp.
1995). Subsection (B) describes the procedures and remedies available under the
Act, including placing certain burdens of proof on "the State," providing for medi-
ation among parties including states, and contemplating that states would be
named as defendants in litigation to enforce the Act. Id. § 2710(d) (7) (B).
121. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) ("[A]ny person who shall be
injured.., by reason of anything forbidding in the antitrust laws may sue .. .in
any district court of the United States.").
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liability.122 The Indian Gaming Act, however, does explicitly con-
template a state becoming a party defendant in an action brought
by a tribe. 123 Thus, the Atascadero "clear statement rule" is easily
satisfied in the Seminole Tribe case.
The majority then addressed the second issue of whether Con-
gress had the authority to do what it clearly attempted to do-elimi-
nate state sovereign immunity from suit under the Indian Gaming
Act.' 24 The Court concluded that Congress lacked such power.125
This constitutional analysis, by far the most important discussion in
the case, first inquired whether Congress's abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity was "'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' 1 26
The Court found the fact that the petitioner Indian tribe sought
only prospective equitable relief in the form of an injunction,
rather than money damages, to be irrelevant as to the issue of state
sovereign immunity. 127 According to the majority, Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit applies to both equitable and legal
relief, injunctions as well as monetary damages. 128 Thus, the relief
sought from a defendant state is not related to the "question [of]
whether the State is bound by the Eleventh Amendment."12 9 The
implications of the Court's decision are therefore broad because it
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (making no statement that would clearly indicate Con-
gress intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity). For a further discussion of the
requirements of the clear statement rule and the probability that they are not met
in the antitrust laws, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text. The more im-
portant issue, however, is whether Congress has the power, if it chose, to subject
states to antitrust liability.
123. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) (stating that Indian tribe may initiate
cause of action against state for failure to enter into negotiations with Indian tribe
or to conduct negotiations in good faith).
124. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124 (concluding that although Congress
clearly intended to abrogate states' immunity in Indian Gaming Act, Court was still
faced with question of whether Congress was authorized to do so).
125. See id. at 1133 ("[W]e have found that Congress did not have authority
under the Constitution to make the States suable in federal court .... ).
126. Id. at 1124 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
127. See id. (stating that "we have often made it clear that the relief sought by
a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment").
128. See id. ("'It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money
judgment is sought."' (quoting Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982))).
129. Id. (citing Coyy, 457 U.S. at 90-91 (holding that Eleventh Amendment
bars suits whether or not money judgments are sought)). The justification for the
Eleventh Amendment was to protect the states' treasuries from federal court or-
ders to pay money but also to protect states against "'the indignity of ... the coer-
cive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1993)
(quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
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embraces state sovereign immunity both in its holding on injunctive
relief and on the issue of damages, which was discussed in dicta.130
Similarly, the majority found it irrelevant that the Indian Gam-
ing Act, which sought to expose states to suit in federal court, may
have also granted power to the states that they otherwise lacked
under the Constitution.1 31 Thus, the only relevant issue is whether
"the Act in question [was] passed pursuant to a constitutional provi-
sion granting Congress the power to abrogate?"' 3 2 This power has
previously been found pursuant to only two constitutional provi-
sions: the Fourteenth Amendment 33  and the Commerce
Clause.' 34
Because the antitrust laws were enacted pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause, the question of whether Congress could abrogate
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under its power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several
130. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124 ("[W]e have often made clear that
the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether
the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.").
131. See id. at 1125 ("The Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be lifted
by Congress unilaterally deciding that it will be replaced by grant of some other
authority."). The Court recognized that the Indian Gaming Act gave authority to
the states that they otherwise lacked under the Constitution. Id. at 1124. Specifi-
cally, the Act granted power to regulate certain aspects of gambling on Indian
lands. Id. Because the state clearly lacked the authority under the Constitution to
regulate activity on Indian lands, the Act attempted to grant power to the states
and to limit power by abrogating state sovereign immunity. The majority, however,
stated that Congress could not avoid the terms of the Eleventh Amendment by
simply granting some other power to states. Id. at 1125.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976) (finding that Four-
teenth Amendment expanded federal government's power and effectively
changed federal-state balance of power originally reflected in Constitution). By
giving Congress the authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
found that the Fourteenth Amendment itself gave Congress the authority to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 456.
Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a judgment against a state for
back pay and attorney fees to a private individual. Id. at 456-57. The Fourteenth
Amendment states in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws .... Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
134. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (holding "Con-
gress has the authority to override state's immunity when legislating pursuant to
the Commerce Clause"), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996). The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have the Power To...
regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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States" 13 5 is important for the future of the state action doctrine.13 6
Less than a decade ago in Union Gas, the Court held that the power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity was as crucial to the Com-
merce Clause as it was to the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 Accord-
ingly, in Seminole Tribe, the Court first had to decide whether the
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause
have meaningful differences. 138 The majority "agree[d] with the
petitioner Seminole Tribe that the plurality opinion in Union Gas
allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn
between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Com-
merce Clause."139 Finding that there were no significant differ-
ences between the two constitutional clauses, the Court was forced
to determine whether to extend to the Indian Commerce Clause
the ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity, or to overturn the
holding of Union Gas.140 The Court chose to overrule Union Gas
and decided that neither the Interstate Commerce Clause nor the
Indian Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 41
135. Id.
136. For a discussion of the future impact of the Seminole Tribe decision, see
infra notes 334-56 and accompanying text.
137. 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that absent "the
authority to render States liable in damages," Congress's power to regulate com-
merce under the Commerce Clause would not be complete).
138. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125. Arguably, there are differences be-
tween the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause. The
Court recognized that the states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty in
agreeing to the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce. Id. at 1126. The Indian Commerce Clause is both consistent with
and indeed broader than the Interstate Commerce Clause, in that the states essen-
tially ceded all authority to regulate Indian tribes and their commerce to the fed-
eral government. Id. This grant of broad authority in allowing Congress to
regulate all commerce by Indian tribes, even if that commerce is entirely intra-
state, is the only arguable difference between the two clauses. Id.
139. Id. at 1127.
140. Id. The Court recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis counsels
strongly against overturning a previous decision. Id. Nevertheless, the Court notes
that stare decisis is a policy and not a command. Id. Moreover, the Union Gas
decision was a plurality and not a majority decision.
141. Id. at 1128. The Court noted that "[o]ur willingness to reconsider our
earlier decisions has been 'particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such
cases, correction through legislative action is practically impossible."' Id. at 1127
(citation omitted). The majority found that the principle of stare decisis did not
require adherence to Union Gas for four reasons: (1) the decision was of little
precedential value because a majority of the Court has expressly disagreed with the
plurality's reasoning; (2) the decision was an interpretation of the Constitution;
(3) the decision's "rationale depart[s] from our established understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment"; and (4) the decision frustrates the purpose of Article III.
Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).
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2. Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity
The majority cited with approval the language of Chief Justice
Hughes in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,142 where the Court
held that a suit by a foreign state against another state was pre-
cluded by the Eleventh Amendment:
Thus Clause one [of Article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution] specifically provides that the judicial
power shall extend "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority." But, although a case may arise under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, the judicial power
does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be prosecuted
against a State, without her consent, by one of her own
citizens ....
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal applica-
tion of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the
letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restric-
tions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control. There is the essential postulate
that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to
be of a justiciable character. There is also the postulate
that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sover-
eignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent,
save where there has been a "surrender of this immunity
in the plan of the convention." 143
In holding that the Eleventh Amendment merely "reflects" the
principle of sovereign immunity, in that states may not be sued
without their consent, the majority found that the Eleventh Amend-
ment stood for the constitutional principle that state sovereign im-
munity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III.144
Thus, the Court essentially held that Article III jurisdiction is im-
plicitly limited by principles of state sovereign immunity and has
142. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
143. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1129 (quoting Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S.
at 321-23).
144. Id. at 1127-28 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 97-98 (1984)); cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989)
(expanding scope ofjurisdiction under Article III-"contradicts our unvarying ap-
proach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal
court jurisdiction"), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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been ever since the founding of the Republic and the ratification of
the Constitution. 45 Congress, therefore, lacks authority to expand
federal jurisdiction beyond those limitations.146
In summary, the majority held that principles of sovereign im-
munity reflected in, but not explicitly stated in, Article III and the
Eleventh Amendment absolutely preclude Congress from subject-
ing states to suit, in law or equity,147 without their consent.148 The
effect of this broadly written decision appears to eliminate virtually
all private suits against states filed under federal statutes that pro-
vide for exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Further, the
majority opinion could be read to even allow states to ignore with-
out sanction the gamut of federal laws that are exclusively enforcea-
ble in federal court.
The Seminole Tribe majority emphasized the existence of three
means to force states to comply with federal law: (1) suits against
states by the federal government, (2) Ex parte Young suits against
state officials to enjoin their compliance with federal law and (3)
Supreme Court review of state court decisions decided on federal
145. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128 (stating that, before Union Gas, "it
had seemed fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III").
146. See id. at 1131 (stating that "the background principle of state sovereign
immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment" applies to all fields, including
those exclusively occupied by federal government). The Court found that "[e]ven
when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a par-
ticular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting States." Id.
147. See id. at 1131 & n.16 (noting that this bar includes actions under bank-
ruptcy, copyright and antitrust statutes). Despite the explicit language of the Elev-
enth Amendment that covers both suits for damages and equitable relief, the
Amendment has been construed to allow suits against states for injunctive relief.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 657 (1974) (holding that action "consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment is necessarily limited to prospective injuctive re-
lief'). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, Justice Stevens had "great difficulty with [such] a con-
struction of the Eleventh Amendment" but recognized that Edelman had construed
the Amendment to allow suits in which the damages are paid directly from state
funds. Id. at 459 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)). The majority in Seminole Tribe makes clear that Justice Stevens's conclu-
sion is "exaggerated both in its substance and in its significance." Seminole Tribe,
116 S. Ct. at 1131 & n.16.
148. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 ("Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States"). The majority referred to sovereign immunity as a "back-
ground principle .. .embodied in the Eleventh Amendment," and emphasized
that the Court has "long [ ] recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the
Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of."' Id. at 1130-31 (citations omitted).
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grounds involving states that consented to suit.149 This last method
clearly is not an option under the antitrust laws, because the United
States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
brought under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.' 50
Recognizing the likely impact of the Seminole Tribe decision on
federal statutory schemes including antitrust, bankruptcy and copy-
right laws, the majority stated that the best remedy, even with re-
spect to statutes which grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction, is
the Ex parte Young injunction.1 51 Specifically referring to antitrust
cases against states, the majority observed that "it has not been
widely thought that the federal antitrust ... statutes abrogated the
States' sovereign immunity."15 2 The Court further noted that it had
never awarded relief against a State under any of the statutory
schemes listed above.1 5 3 In at least one leading antitrust case, how-
ever, the Court found that a state bar association was not immune
when it provided for the enforcement of a minimum fee sched-
149. Id. at 1131 nn.14 & 16. In his dissent of Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter
described these options as "pretty cold comfort." Id. at 1172 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Souter recognized that federal law enforcement resources are not
unlimited, federal appellate review is dependent on state consent to state court
litigation (which is not even an option in Sherman Act cases in any event), and the
Ex parte Young injunction could itself be limited by a future Court. Id. at 1172 &
n.52 (Souter, J., dissenting). Finally, he correctly noted that private litigation to
enforce federal laws has been an important part of many federal statutory schemes.
Id. (Souter,J., dissenting). He specifically recognized the key role of such "private
Attorneys General" in civil rights, environmental law and antitrust cases. Id. (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting). See, e.g., California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284
(1990) (stating that "[p]rivate enforcement of the [Clayton] Act was in no sense
an afterthought; it was an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting
competition").
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("Whenever the United States is
hereinafter injured ... by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it may
sue therefor in the United States district court .... ).
151. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.16 ("[A]n individual may obtain
injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing
violation of federal law."). Such a remedy would be in the form of injunctive relief
and not damages. The antitrust laws provide for treble damages and injunctive
relief for all persons injured in their "business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws .... 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15. Indeed, the treble dam-
ages remedy has been described as designed in part to promote enforcement of
the antitrust laws by private parties. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petro-
leum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1990) (describing § 4 as a "remedial provision");
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 n.6 (1989) (stating that "[in a
previous case] the Court was concerned not merely that direct purchasers have
sufficient incentive to bring suit under the antitrust laws.., but rather that at least
some party have sufficient incentive to bring suit").
152. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.16.
153. Id.
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ule,154 although it is not clear whether relief in the form of an in-
junction was actually awarded. Moreover, the majority in Seminole
Tribe found that, "antitrust laws have been in force for over a cen-
tury, [and] there is no established tradition in the lower federal
courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the
States."1 55 As discussed below, this view both misses the point and
appears to be inappropriately narrow.
C. Dissenting Opinions to Majority's Holding
In his dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, characterized the majority's decision as "hold[ing] for the
first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no
authority to subject a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court at
the behest of an individual asserting a federal right."'156 Tracing the
development of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity from the
pre-constitutional era, Justice Souter argued that "the adoption of
the Constitution made [the States] members of a novel federal sys-
tem that sought to balance the States' exercise of some sovereign
prerogatives delegated from their own people with the principle of
a limited but centralizing federal supremacy."'157 The dissent ar-
gued that "[g]iven the Framers' general concern with curbing
abuses by state governments, it would be amazing if the scheme of
delegated powers embodied in the Constitution had left the Na-
154. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (enjoining
enforcement of minimum fee schedules by county and state bar association as vio-
lative of Sherman Antitrust Act). In Goldfarb, prospective home buyers brought a
class action suit alleging antitrust violations against the state and county bar as-
sociations. Id. at 775-78. The county bar prescribed a minimum fee schedule for
legal services offered by attorneys in the State of Virginia. Id. The state bar then
threatened sanctions for an ethical violation if an attorney charged below the mini-
mum fee. Id. The Supreme Court found the use of the minimum fee schedule to
be a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 791-92. The Court noted that "[tihe fact
the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purpose does not create an anti-
trust shield." Id.
Certainly most antitrust actions involving the state action defense seek treble
damages against a private defendant. The state action doctrine, however, does not
foreclose antitrust actions against state governments, and courts have denied im-
munity asserted by state defendants. See id. (finding "State Bar[, a named defend-
ant,] . . . has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive
activity, and in that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act"). For a further discussion of the Goldfarb case and the state action doctrine,
see infra notes 175, 217 and accompanying text.
155. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132 n.16.
156. See id. at 1145 (Souter,J., dissenting) (noting that majority "invokes the
Eleventh Amendment as authority for this proposition").
157. See id. at 1169 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "the act of ratification
affected [the States'] sovereignty in a way different from any previous political
event in America or anywhere else").
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tional Government powerless to render the States judicially ac-
countable for violations of federal rights."15  The dissent
recognized that Congress has infrequently sought to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, particularly in situations other than to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, but maintaining that the power to do
so in appropriate cases is critical to the federal system.1 5 9
Moreover, the dissent argued that the historical evidence sup-
ported Congress's power to create federal rights and to authorize
private parties to enforce these rights, even against a state. 160 Jus-
tice Souter criticized the majority's reliance on "background princi-
ples" and "implicit limitations," arguing that these are at odds with
the text of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers. He con-
cluded that the Constitution neither mandates state sovereign im-
munity in federal question cases nor denies Congress the power to
subject states to suits in federal court to enforce federal causes of
action. 161
Faulting the decision as "a sharp break with the past," Justice
Stevens also dissented by observing that the majority "prevents Con-
gress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions
against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to
those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regula-
tion of our vast national economy."1 62 The regulation to which Jus-
tice Stevens referred was, of course, antitrust and trade regulation.
Indeed, he stated that "[a] s federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under these federal laws [including the anti-
trust laws], the majority's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment
shields States from being sued under them in federal court suggests
that persons harmed by state violations of federal ... antitrust laws
have no remedy." 163
As a response to states and their agencies being named as de-
fendants in antitrust cases, the state action doctrine developed to
158. See id. at 1171 (Souter, J., dissenting) (concluding that "of course the
Framers did not understand the scheme to leave the government powerless").
159. See id. at 1173 (Souter,J., dissenting) (contending that it is unreasonable
to believe that Framers meant to "leave the National Government without any way
to render individuals capable of enforcing their federal rights directly against an
intransigent state").
160. Id. at 1173-74 (Souter,J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 1177-78 (Souter,J., dissenting) (explaining that both Constitu-
tion's text and Framers' intent was clear, thus majority overstepped its authority
when it looked to "background principles" and "implicit limitation [s]").
162. Id. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 1134 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Congress has
the power to ensure that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the
State being sued").
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allow only limited attacks against the anticompetitive actions of
these state actors. 164 Because both the antitrust laws and the Indian
Gaming Act were enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 165 the
state action doctrine, which provides only limited immunity for
states and state entities, is plainly implicated by the language of the
majority.' 66 The Seminole Tribe decision now eliminates the possibil-
ity of any such attacks by protecting states from all suits in federal
court.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST STATE ACTION
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Lack of Congressional Intent to Create Immunity
The modem state action doctrine represents more than fifty
years of legal development and refinement.167 This doctrine of lim-
ited immunity in antitrust actions essentially represents a "workable
balance between the interest of a state in carrying out legitimate
regulation of commerce and the interest of a citizen in obtaining
redress for injuries sustained as a result of unauthorized anticompe-
titive conduct of state agencies." 168 The broad and generalized lan-
164. For a discussion of the development of the antitrust state action doc-
trine, see infra notes 169-270 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause as a basis for enacting the anti-
trust laws and the Indian Gaming Act, see supra notes 87, 99 and accompanying
text, respectively. See also United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 558 (1944) (noting that "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of
its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements"); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 368 (1943) (finding antitrust regulation valid under Com-
merce Clause); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 252-54 (1940)
(upholding conviction of defendants under Sherman Act). See generally OWEN Fiss,
8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 107-54 (1993) (discussing
background of antitrust laws).
166. For a discussion of the state action doctrine, see infra notes 182-270 and
accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the judicial development of the state action doctrine,
see infra notes 182-215 and accompanying text. During the first three quarters of a
century following the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, government
antitrust cases were directly appealable from United States District Courts to the
United States Supreme Court pursuant to an amendment to the Expediting Act in
1974. See 15 U.S.C. § 28 (repealed 1984). Consequently, the basic antitrust doc-
trines, including the state action doctrine, were incrementally developed by the
Supreme Court in successive cases. In 1974, the Clayton Antitrust Act was
amended to allow direct appeals in any antitrust cases certified by the district court
judge that is deemed to be "of general public importance in the administration of
justice." 15 U.S.C. § 29(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995). Thus, the framework of the state
action doctrine was essentially in place before the repeal of the Expediting Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3358.
168. Harris & Kenny, supra note 27, at 651. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), the Court discussed this balance, by stating
that "[c]ommon to the two implied [antitrust] exclusions was potential conflict
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guage of the antitrust laws demonstrates "a carefully studied
attempt to bring within the [Sherman] Act every person engaged in
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial
intercourse among the states." 169 In enacting the antitrust laws,
Congress exercised "the full extent of its constitutional power [to
regulate commerce by seeking] to establish a regime of competi-
tion as the fundamental principle governing commerce in this
country."170 Arguably, Congress also implicitly intended to sup-
plant competition and immunize states from antitrust liability, at
least in circumstances in which the state is acting in the role of the
"sovereign."' 71 The state action doctrine, however, requires courts
to strike a balance between competition and state sovereignty
rather than to blindly immunize state actors sued under the anti-
trust laws.
There is no basis, however, in the legislative history of the anti-
trust laws to conclude that Congress intended for the courts to cre-
ate the state action doctrine in the precise terms that have been
developed over the past century, since the enactment of the Sher-
man Act in 1890. The text of the original antitrust statutes, the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, are brief and general, with only a few
lines comprising the two simple sections that are the crux of the
antitrust laws: one section forbids restraints of trade and the other
prohibits monopolization.1 72 Summarizing the legislative history of
with policies of signal importance in our national traditions and governmental
structure of federalism." Harris & Kenny, supra note 27, at 399-400 (citing Lafay-
ette, 435 U.S. at 389) (referencing exclusion for "concerted effort by persons to
influence lawmakers to enact legislation beneficial to themselves or detrimental to
competitors" and for state action when the state is acting as sovereign). The Court
further stated that "[e]ven then, however, the recognized exclusions have been
unavailing to prevent antitrust enforcement which, though implicating those fun-
damental policies, was not thought severely to impinge upon them." Id.
169. South-Eastern Undewriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 553 (finding that insurance
business was not excluded from Sherman Act). The Court found the language of
the Sherman Act to be comprehensive and held that application of the Act to "all
combinations of business" was consistent with the intent of its drafters. Id.
170. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 398; see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948) (discussing expansive reach of con-
gressional power under Commerce Clause in defining "interstate" commerce).
171. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 338, 368 (1943) (holding that "in view of
the [Sherman Act's] words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of
individual and not state action"). The Court, however, has also recognized that
exemptions from the antitrust laws should not freely be implied, reasoning that
the antitrust laws "establish overarching and fundamental policies," which counsel
against both "repeal by implication" and "implied exclusions." Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 398.
172. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (referencing basic federal antitrust statutes). Sec-
tion 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Id. § 1. Section 2 provides that "[e]very per-
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the Sherman Act, Professor Philip Areeda noted that "[o] n most
issues, the legislative background simply fails to communicate more
than the statutory language itself."1 73 Thus, the substantive anti-
trust rules, including the state action doctrine, were intended by
Congress to be common law rules, and as such, these rules have
been developed by federal courts over the past 100 years. 174
The state action doctrine is not limited to protecting "states"
but may also shield private parties from antitrust liability in certain
circumstances. Further, the term "state" encompasses both the ju-
dicial175 and legislative1 76 branches of state government, as well as
executive departments and agencies. 177 Local governmental enti-
ties may also enjoy limited antitrust immunity under the state ac-
tion doctrine.1 78  In a critical distinction from Eleventh
Amendment analysis, however, governmental entities are not im-
son who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize.., shall be deemed guilty of a felony."
Id. § 2.
173. SeeAREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, § 106, at 15 (stating that, other than
finding some evidence that Congress "sought to achieve the social and economic
benefits of a free market, ... we find the legislative history of the antitrust laws
deserving little weight").
174. Id. Professors Areeda and Turner opine that Congress intended the an-
titrust law to be judge-made common law, by noting that "[n]othing else could
reasonably have been expected in the judicial administration of [those laws]." Id.
Chief Justice Hughes referred to the Sherman Act as a "charter of freedom" that
was written with a "generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions." Id. (citing Appalachian Coals v. United
States, 228 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933)).
175. See e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977) (finding state
supreme court wields power over practice of law and may therefore be immune
from antitrust liability under state action doctrine); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (finding local and state bar associations may be pro-
tected by state action doctrine but holding use of "minimum-fee schedules" was
unenforceable because it was "essentially a private anticompetitive activity"). For a
discussion of the factual background of Goldfarb, see supra note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
176. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (applying state action doctrine to determine whether to
protect legislative act but finding resale price maintenance system for liquor pric-
ing was not protected under state action doctrine, even though California Legisla-
ture authorized such price setting).
177. See, e.g., Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,
471 U.S. 48, 63-64 (1985) (declaring agency alone could not immunize collective
private action unless "state" authorized activity). In Southern Motor, the Court
found sufficient authority as the state legislature established a regulatory agency.
Id.
178. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393-94
(plurality opinion) (finding that municipalities are shielded under state action
doctrine only if they are acting pursuant to state policy). For a further discussion
of the Lafayette decision, see infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
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mune from the antitrust laws simply because of their governmental
Status. 179
After Atascadero and Union Gas, it should have been clear that
the antitrust liability of states under the state action doctrine might
not survive a constitutional challenge because there is no "clear
statement" of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in the antitrust laws. After examining the legislative history
of the Sherman Act, the Court, in Parker v. Brown,180 found congres-
sional intent to immunize states from antitrust suits in federal
court, even though there is no such explicit statement in the text of
the Sherman Act.181
B. Judicial Development of State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine was first recognized in Parker v.
Brown.'8 2 In 1943, a California raisin producer brought an action
179. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 390 n.4
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, unlike states, municipalities will not
receive protection under Eleventh Amendment); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408 (stating
that "[i]f municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely by
their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a
serious link in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with
the comprehensive natural policy Congress established" (emphasis added)). In
Lafayette, Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Marshall, Powell
and Stevens comprised the majority with respect to Part I of the opinion. Justices
Marshall, Powell, and Stevens also joined Parts II and III ofJustice Brennan's opin-
ion. Separate opinions were filed by: (1) Justice Marshall, concurring; (2) Chief
Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment and concurring in Part I; (3) Justice
Stewart, dissenting, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist and in part by Justice
Blackmun; and (4) Justice Blackmun, dissenting. The fragmented plurality opin-
ion in Lafayette reflects the difficulty the Court has had in determining the limits of
antitrust liability of governmental entities.
180. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
181. Id. at 350-52 (noting that "there is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain
state action in the [Sherman] Act's legislative history"); see Harris & Kenny, supra
note 27, at 708, 715 (predicting this result but arguing that state agency which is
not immune under state action doctrine is not "a state").
182. Id. at 352 (holding that California regulatory scheme was not violative of
Sherman Act because Sherman Act is "prohibition of individual not state action").
The principle of state action immunity originated much earlier. See Eastern R.R.
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961) (finding no
antitrust violation "where a restraint of trade or monopolization is the result of
valid governmental action, as opposed to private action"); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49-59 (1911) (finding that Sherman Act forbids only
those trade restraints and monopolizations created by or attempted by the acts of
"individuals or corporations"); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904) (finding
that "no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the
duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolv-
ing upon them by law"). In Noerr, the Court stated that "where a restraint upon
trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to
private action, no violation of the Act can be made out." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136
(citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 341; United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533
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against California Director of Agriculture W.B. Parker, the Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commissioners, the Raisin Proration Zone
Number 1 and its members, and other defendants responsible for
administering a prorate marketing program established under a
California state statute.183 The state itself was not named as a de-
fendant in the case' 84 and state sovereign immunity under the Hans
doctrine was not discussed by the trial court or the Supreme Court.
Moreover, neither opinion discussed the Ex parte Young doctrine,
although the complaint was brought against state officials,' 85
among other defendants, to enjoin enforcement of a statute alleged
to be unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce.1
86
Under the rationale of Ex parte Young, such an injunction would
have been appropriate. '1 7 Indeed, if the defendant state officials
(1939)); see also Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing
Parker as origin of state action doctrine), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Feldman v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 460 U.S. 462, 474 n.11
(1983) (denying certiorari from disposition of antitrust claims by D.C. Circuit).
The progressive development of the state action doctrine has defined more pre-
cisely the "valid governmental action" in conjunction with determining who should
be immune from antitrust liability.
183. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 895-96 (S.D. Cal. 1941), rev'd, 317 U.S.
341 (1943). Plaintiff Brown was a California raisin packer. Id. Because the case
concerned a California citizen suing California government entities and officials,
the language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibiting suits against states by nonci-
tizens arguably would not control. The Hans doctrine and subsequent cases, how-
ever, make it clear that Eleventh Amendment analysis also applies to actions by
citizens against their own states. For a discussion of the Hans doctrine, see supra
notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
184. Parker, 39 F. Supp. at 895-96. The Supreme Court does not mechanically
use the identity of parties named in the pleadings as dispositive of whether or not
the "state" is the real party in interest in the suit. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 236, 246-47 (1985) (finding that state was real party in inter-
est when plaintiff sued state hospital and state department of mental health for
damages and equitable relief). For a further discussion of the Atascadero case, see
supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
185. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 344 (noting that defendants included State Direc-
tor of Agriculture). This seems contrary to the Court's recent mandate that
"[s]uits against state officials in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits
against the State." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentucky v. Gra-
ham, 472 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).
186. Parker, 317 U.S. at 344 (stating question before Court was whether mar-
keting program was violative of Commerce Clause). The trial court enjoined Cali-
fornia's raisin marketing program, holding that it impermissibly interfered with
interstate commerce. Parker, 39 F. Supp. at 902. California had argued that the
state's police power allowed it to enact regulations to protect the public welfare,
even though the regulations affect interstate commerce. Id. at 899. The State's
argument, however, failed and the trial court granted an injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the marketing program. Id. at 895.
187. SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (allowing injunctive relief
against state official by claiming that official is acting ultra vires). The Court ex-
plained that:
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had raised sovereign immunity as a defense, the Court could have
applied the Hans doctrine to dismiss the action, and the state action
doctrine might never have emerged. Instead, the Parker Court rec-
ognized the obvious; California's raisin marketing program would
be an illegal restraint of trade if it had been planned and effectu-
ated entirely by a "contract, combination or conspiracy of private
persons, individual or corporate."1 88 What made the Parker situa-
tion different from the traditional private restraint of trade forbid-
den by antitrust law was the entanglement of the state in the
challenged program. 189
The Parker Court found unconvincing the assertion of a con-
gressional intent to impose antitrust liability on states, but the
Court assumed that Congress could have decided otherwise. Find-
ing no explicit congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity, the Court said:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in
its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature. In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only
as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their au-
thority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
[W]here an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State
[and the] act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be
so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to
the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and
one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental ca-
pacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in at-
tempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative
enactment which is void because [it is] unconstitutional.
Id. For a further discussion of Ex parte Young, see supra notes 89-94 and accompa-
nying text.
188. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
189. Id. at 345-46. The regulatory scheme provided for pooling of 70% of all
raisins produced in California by all producers and payment of set fees based on
weight for this produce. Id. at 347-48. The sale of the remainder of the raisins was
also restricted. Id. at 348. Unless some other exemption applied, a naked agree-
ment on prices is per se unlawful. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 342 (1982) (holding that "price-fixing agreements are unlawful on their
face"); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217-18 (1940) (hold-
ing that "price-fixing agreements are unlawful per sd'). It is beyond the scope of
this Article to opine on whether the antitrust exemption for agricultural producers
and cooperatives under the Capper-Volstead Act would have been applicable to
the raisin marketing program in Parker. See Capper-Volstead Agricultural Produ-
cers' Associations Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (authorizing certain
associations of persons engaged in production of agricultural products); 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing antitrust exemption for certain labor, agri-
cultural and horticultural organizations).
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress. 190
The Parker decision was based only in part on the language of
the Sherman Act and its legislative history. The Court did note that
the Sherman Act itself refers only to "persons" and not to
"states."19' Such statutory analysis, however, was not the only rea-
son for the decision. The Court found that considerations of feder-
alism were also significant and that interference with state
sovereignty would not be implied without a clear indication of legis-
lative intent.1 92 The Court's conclusion has been recognized by
commentators as a practical necessity:
To have held the Sherman Act applicable to the states
could have removed the authority of the states to create
such traditional monopolies as common carriers, to regu-
late for the protection of the public, or to adopt other
than a regime of competition even though peculiar local
conditions required a different course which a busy na-
tional Congress was unlikely to consider.' 93
The rationale expressed in Parker and its progeny is based
upon the Court's assumption that Congress did not intend the
Sherman Act to reach certain actions of government entities. The
190. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
191. See id. at 351 ("The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such;
and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action
directed by a state."). See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (providing that "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue" therefore and recover treble damages); Clay-
ton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (authorizing injunctive relief for "[a]ny person, firm,
corporation or association"); Restraint of Trade Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (defining
"person" to include "corporations and associations" but does not include states in
definition).
While a state's action may not be restrained by the Sherman Act, "[a] state
may maintain a suit for damages under it." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. See, e.g., Califor-
nia v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) (holding that state's remedy
for corporation's antitrust violations under Clayton Act may be divestiture); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972) (holding that states can sue for
injuries to commercial interests but may not recover for damages to general econ-
omy); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (holding that Geor-
gia as "person" may sue for injuries from violations of antitrust laws); Georgia v.
Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942) (holding states are entitled to treble damages
under Sherman Act).
192. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (stating that "an unexpressed purpose to nul-
lify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress"); AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 1 212a, at 69 (finding Supreme Court
concerned with implications of federalism in Parker decision).
193. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 1 212, at 69 (discussing authority of
states to regulate commerce as long as regulation complies with Constitution).
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Court found that Congress did not intend to abrogate all of the
states' sovereign immunity, which might thus subject states to anti-
trust injunctions and treble damages in every case involving a state
defendant. 194 The Court assumed instead that Congress intended
to abrogate some part of state sovereign immunity and had the
power to do So.195 The Parker Court sought to balance the compet-
ing policies of favoring competition in the marketplace and al-
lowing states to act in their sovereign capacity without threat of
liability.1 96 In Parker, the Court concluded that the state "as sover-
eign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sher-
man Act did not undertake to prohibit." 197 Thus, the Court created
a limited immunity under the state action doctrine. This doctrine
may thus shield state and private actors in certain situations, how-
ever, it may also leave these actors subject to suit and liability if the
conditions for immunity are not met.198 The Parker Court con-
cluded that states should be immune or exempt from the antitrust
laws when, but only when, they consciously acted in their sovereign
capacity to supplant competition.1 99
In developing the state action doctrine, courts have been en-
gaged in creating standards to discern whether governmental ac-
tions rise to the level of conscious decisions of a sovereign state,
which are entitled to antitrust immunity. The state action doctrine
looks behind the governmental action and inquires whether it is
194. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (expressing concerns of federalism by recog-
nizing importance of state sovereignty "in a dual system of government"). The
Court further recognized that there was "no hint that [the Sherman Act] intended
to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id.
195. See id. at 350 ("We may assume also, without deciding, that Congress
could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining a
stabilization program like the present because of its effect on interstate
commerce.").
196. See id. at 351 (noting concerns of federalism "in a dual system of
government").
197. Id. at 352.
198. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980) (adopting Midcal two-prong test for state action immunity
based upon reasoning of Parker). For a further discussion of the two-prong Midcal
test, see infra notes 226-50 and accompanying text. Thus, a state or private actor
could be subject to liability in situations where the state had not complied with the
two-prong test, which requires a clear articulation of a state policy to displace com-
petition and active supervision of private parties acting pursuant to that state pol-
icy. Id. But seeTown of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 & n.10 (1986)
(finding that municipalities and state agencies may not have to prove "active super-
vision" requirement). For a discussion of municipalities and state agencies under
the Midcal test, see infra notes 230-32, 235.
199. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51 (finding states to be sovereigns "in a dual
system of government" and that Sherman Act is devoid of purpose "to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature").
[Vol. 42: p. 111
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sufficiently the act of a sovereign state so as to be entitled to the
deference demanded by federalism.200 This analysis was never per-
formed or even contemplated in Seminole Tribe. Instead, the Semi-
nole Tribe Court simply announced the blanket constitutional rule
that states are immune as sovereigns and thus are not subject to suit
in federal court.20 1 The rationale of Parke, therefore, must not be
confused with the rationale of Seminole Tribe. The latter holding is
broader and, according to the majority, is constitutionally based. 202
Indeed, Seminole Tribe essentially invalidates the underlying reason-
ing of Parker, which balances state sovereignty with the competing
goal of competition.
The Parker analysis went no further than declaring that a state
program may be violative of the antitrust laws if "it [was] organized
and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or
conspiracy with private persons, individual or corporate."20 3 The
Parker Court did not announce the precise limits of state antitrust
immunity to guide future courts when determining if antitrust im-
munity should be granted to a state engaged in economic regula-
tion or to private actors complying with state regulatory schemes.
The Parker Court did, however, establish certain basic principles:
(1) "a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sher-
man Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their
action is lawful";204 (2) the state may not become "a participant in
a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of
trade";20 5 and (3) the "state itself [must] exercise[ ] its legislative
authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the condi-
200. See, e.g., Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(describing test used in determining whether there is clear state policy with requi-
site state supervision), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Feldman v.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 460 U.S. 462, 474 n.11 (1983) (denying
certiorari from disposition of antitrust claims by D.C. Circuit). In Feldman, this
distinction was clearly made by the D.C. Circuit, which noted that "[t]his inquiry
[into whether the state action test is satisfied] becomes necessary when an act by a
subordinate government agency is at stake, for it is well settled that not everything
it does is an act of the state as sovereign. There obviously is no need for any inves-
tigation of that sort when the action plainly is taken in a sovereign capacity." Id.
201. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (holding that
"Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capa-
ble of being sued in federal court"). Therefore, the Supreme Court had no juris-
diction to consider the Seminole Tribe's suit against Florida under the Indian
Gaming Act. Id. For a discussion of the holding in Seminole Tribe, see supra notes
113-55 and accompanying text.
202. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (holding that decision is based upon
Eleventh Amendment).
203. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350.
204. Id. at 351 (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
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tions of its application."2 0 6 The Court implied that the state must
"create[ ] the machinery" for the regulatory program, "adopt[ ] the
program" and "enforce[ ] it with penal sanctions [ ], in the execu-
tion of a governmental policy. '20 7 The state program supplanting
competition must also be the will of the state-"not the imposition
by [the private parties] of their will upon the minority by force of
agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits."208
In summary, a state, acting as a sovereign, which deliberately adopts
and enforces a desired restraint of trade will be immune from liabil-
ity under the antitrust laws.20 9
The Parker case addressed the potential antitrust liability of
state governmental entities. The private parties that benefitted
under the raisin regulation in Parker were not even named as de-
fendants in the original case. 210 Thus, the Court did not have to
decide whether the newly-created state action doctrine applied pro-
tection to private firms as well as states, and under what circum-
stances private parties might be immune from antitrust liability.
After Parker, the Court was not immediately confronted with
the issue of whether a private firm, acting at the direction of a state
or pursuant to a state regulatory policy, shared the immunity of
states under the state action doctrine. As late as 1976, a plurality of
the Court suggested that Parker immunized only states, and not pri-
vate parties. 211 Recent cases, however, have confirmed that the
206. Id. at 352.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; cf Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-89
(1951) (denying immunity where state had provision that enforced price-fixing
not only against parties to private, unsupervised contracts but also against nonsign-
ers). SeegenerallyAREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 213a, at 72 (citation omitted)
("The juxtaposition of Parker and Schwegmann, therefore, suggests that a state may
be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable, provided that it
substitutes adequate public control wherever it has substantially weakened
competition.").
210. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941), rev'd, 317 U.S. 341
(1943).
211. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (holding that state's sole electric supplier's tariff setting forth lightbulb
exchange program is not exempted from federal antitrust laws because state ap-
proved tariff). In Cantor, Detroit Edison Co. established a lightbulb exchange pro-
gram for its customers. Id. at 583. The Michigan Public Service Commission had
approved tariffs setting forth the program. Id. Detroit Edison Co. stated that the
program's purpose was to increase the consumption of electricity. Id. at 584. Can-
tor asserted that the program's effect was to foreclose competition in a substantial
segment of the lightbulb market. Id. The plurality relied on a narrow interpreta-
tion of Parker's holding that "even though comparable programs organized by pri-
vate persons would be illegal, the action taken by state officials pursuant to express
legislative command did not violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 589. The plurality
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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state action doctrine protects private parties acting pursuant to state
regulation, as well as government entities. 21 2 This is clearly the cor-
rect result and promotes the two policies of the state action doc-
trine: federalism and competition. Commentators of the law have
rationalized this extension by explaining that "[i]f the federal gov-
ernment or a private litigant could have enforced the antitrust laws
against [private firms,] . . .effectuation of state policy would have
been thwarted just as if the State Action exclusion were never cre-
ated. To avoid such a result, immunity must be granted to private
parties as well. '213
Following the Parker decision, the issue of state antitrust liabil-
ity under the Eleventh Amendment was apparently not brought
before the Court until the recent Seminole Tribe decision. Between
the Atascadero decision in 1985 and the Seminole Tribe decision in
1996, the Supreme Court decided a number of major state action
cases but did not have the occasion to discuss state sovereign immu-
nity apart from the state action doctrine.21 4 The undiscussed issue
further emphasized the inapplicability of Parker to the Cantor case because Parker
only applied to "official action taken by state officials." Id. at 590. The majority of
the Court, however, disagreed with the plurality on this point. See id. at 603-04
(Burger, CJ., concurring in part) (stating that Parker cannot "logically be limited
to suits against state officials" but concluding that Parker does not address precise
issue in Cantor); id. at 616-17 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that plurality limit-
ing Parker to state, acting as sovereign, "trivializes" Parker and is inconsistent with
subsequent decisions applying Parker). The plurality was correct in that the Parker
Court did not concern or even have reason to address the liability of private parties
acting pursuant to anticompetitive state regulations because such parties were
never sued in the Parker case. See Brown, 39 F. Supp. at 895 (stating that antitrust
action only brought against state parties).
212. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (allowing private party
state action immunity only when Midcal two-prong test is satisfied); Southern Mo-
tor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1985) (find-
ing reasoning expressed in Parker "extends to private parties").
213. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 212b, at 69-70 (contending that,
notwithstanding plurality's opinion, majority of Cantor Court was correct in ex-
tending state action immunity to private individuals based on Parker Court's feder-
alism rationale). For a further discussion of the Cantor decision, see supra note 211
and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 639-40 (1992) (denying
state action immunity to title insurance companies who violated unfair competi-
tion statute because state did not supervise rate-setting scheme); City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368, 384 (1991) (ruling that City of
Columbia and billboard company were immune from antitrust laws for zoning or-
dinances that restricted new billboard construction); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94,
105-06 (1988) (holding that state action immunity does not apply to physician peer
review committees where there is no showing that state has active supervision over
committee decisions); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 352 (1987) (hold-
ing state liquor pricing system invalid notwithstanding state action exemption be-
cause state failed to supervise); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at
65-66 (holding that state action immunity applied to rate-making activities of pri-
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remaining before Seminole Tribe was whether Congress could abro-
gate state sovereign immunity in federal statutes enacted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause and thus subject states to an antitrust suit.
Seminole Tribe finally answered this question in the negative, thereby
limiting the state action doctrine to private parties acting pursuant
to state regulation of markets and thus rendering the doctrine su-
perfluous for states and state governmental entities.21 5
C. Modern State Action Doctrine
1. Initial Formulations
The modern state action doctrine was developed in a progres-
sion of cases that considered alternative formulations of a standard
that would implement the Parker rule. Federalism and the promo-
tion of competition are the real bases for state action immunity, not
economic efficiency.216 Initially, the Court articulated a two part
vate rate bureaus under Midcal two-prong test, even though not compelled by
states); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985) (holding ac-
tions of municipality taken pursuant to state policy were qualified for state action
immunity, without requiring state supervision to be found).
215. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (concluding
that Eleventh Amendment bars states from being sued). The majority in Seminole
Tribe held that Congress lacked the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Therefore, even if Congress has exclu-
sive control over a particular area, such as Indian Commerce, the Eleventh Amend-
ment prohibits private parties from suing unconsenting states. Id. at 1131. Thus,
sovereign immunity is mandated by the Constitution itself and Congress lacks the
authority to arrive at a different conclusion for the states. See id. at 1130-31 (noting
that state sovereign immunity, unlike other principles of common law, prompted
constitutional amendment).
216. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 212.1f, at 145 (asserting that
governing principle in finding immunity is federalism rather than economic ra-
tionality). In crafting the Parker decision and its progeny, the Court "neither
[knew] nor asked about the overall impact upon consumer welfare of the state-
authorized displacements of competition its doctrines allow. Even if such empiri-
cal assessments were available, the Court might nevertheless doubt its competence
to judge the wisdom of particular state encroachments on the competitive regime."
Id. Moreover, the legislative history of the antitrust laws demonstrates that the
drafters of the antitrust laws were motivated by a variety of other factors, including
politics and a concern about wealth transfers from consumers to firms with market
ower. For a discussion on the background of the antitrust laws, see Robert
ande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 80-142 (1982) (discussing Sherman
Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Clayton Act and Celler-Kefauver Act regulat-
ing antitrust activity); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1051, 1075 (1979) (arguing that "trend toward use of an exclusively economic
approach to antitrust analysis excludes important political considerations"). As
discussed below, the states have considerable freedom to intervene in the market-
place and impose state regulation, which may have anticompetitive effects for free
competition. Again, this intervention should be accompanied by the state clearly
and affirmatively expressing its intention to supersede competition and actually
supervising the product of its regulation, if the state expects its regulation to be
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/3
1997] ANTITRUST STATE ACTION IMMUNITY
test: first, the state must be acting as a sovereign and second, the
state must compel, not merely "prompt," the anticompetitive con-
duct.2 1 7 If the state met this early formulation of the state action
test, the defendant state or private party would be immune from
antitrust liability.2 18 State compulsion appeared to have been re-
quired in two early cases,219 but later cases have rejected any re-
quirement of "compulsion" as a factor that is essential for antitrust
immunity.220 Thus, even if only endorsed by the state, private an-
ticompetitive actions, may be exempt.221 A state promulgated and
enforced regulation, however, immunizes both the private firms
acting pursuant to the regulation and the government agency it-
self.222 In rejecting a compulsion requirement, 223 the Court recog-
nized again that the state action doctrine represents a balance
between potentially conflicting principles: the national interest in
competition represented by the antitrust laws, and concerns of fed-
protected by state action immunity under the Midcal test. For a further discussion
of the Midcal test, see infra notes 226-50 and accompanying text.
217. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (concluding
that "its not enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action;
rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the state acting
as sovereign"). For a discussion of the factual background of Goldfarb, see supra
note 154 and accompanying text. The Court did not clearly define the phrase "the
State acting as sovereign" but did note that states have a compelling interest in
regulating lawyers "as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests." Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792. This suggests that the Court recog-
nized a difference between states acting as regulators and states participating in
markets. This further suggests that if a state chooses to participate in a market, for
example, selling a particular product, it loses immunity and must act competitively.
218. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-92 (holding that minimum-fee schedule for law-
yer services published by county bar association was not immune from Sherman
Act claim because conduct was considered private anticompetitive activity and not
state action).
219. See id. (stating that anticompetitive activities must be compelled by state
acting as sovereign in order to warrant immunity under Sherman Act); see also
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 593 n.28 (1976) (stating that actions
merely complementing objectives in state ethical code but not compelled by state
are not immune from claims under Sherman Act).
220. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 59 (1985) (rejecting court of appeals's assumption "that if anticompetitive ac-
tivity is not compelled, the state can have no interest in whether private parties
engage in that conduct").
221. See id. at 59-60 (stating that "federal antitrust laws do not forbid the
States to adopt policies that permit, but do not compe4 anticompetitive conduct by
regulated private parties" (emphasis added)).
222. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977) (holding
that state bar association's actions were immune under Parker exemption to Sher-
man Act because state policy was active "supervision" and not mere acquiescence).
223. Although compulsion is not necessary to provide immunity, it is clearly
probative as to the state's intent to supersede competition. See AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 5, 1 214bl, at 85 (noting that state may not be deemed to intend anti-
trust immunity when it merely responds to entity's initiative).
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eralism that require deference to state sovereignty and the states'
power to impose economic regulations. 224
Although the Supreme Court has, in some cases, tried to distin-
guish between core areas where states have a legitimate interest in
regulation and other areas that are less crucial to the exercise of
states' police power, this distinction did not become a part of the
modern test.2 2 5
2. The Two-Prong Midcal Analysis
The modem two-prong test rationally and practically balances
the interests of competition and state sovereignty. 226 The modern
standard emerged in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,227 where a private wine distributor challenged Cali-
fornia's regulation of wine sales as an antitrust violation. 228 The
Court adopted a two-prong test to determine whether states and
224. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1992) (noting that
"[i]mmunity is conferred out of respect for ongoing regulation by the State, not
out of respect for the economics of price restraint").
225. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62 (distinguishing state's interest in regulating
practice of law from state's lack of interest in lightbulb market).
226. Clearly, even when a state follows the "rules" constructed by the
Supreme Court in order to achieve immunity for itself and private entities under
the state action doctrine, there is the potential that a state may frustrate the bal-
ance between marketplace competition and state sovereignty by imposing unneces-
sary regulations in a market that is working efficiently. On the other hand, state
regulation has been viewed as appropriate in markets of traditional concern to
states where competition fails: zoning, public transportation and natural monopo-
lies, which historically include telecommunications and cable television. Whether
state regulation, on balance or in specific cases, is preferable to competition de-
pends upon one's willingness to trust the skill and impartiality of state government
regulators to effectuate the public interest. The alternative would require the fed-
eral courts to evaluate individual state regulatory schemes and strike those that
impermissibly interfere with competition. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,
1 212.1f, at 145-47 (arguing that "Court's view of federalism has left enormous
discretion to the states to displace competition"). Such debates over state regula-
tion are indeed academic after Seminole Tribe, because the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively declared that concerns of federalism and sovereignty trump other
considerations such as competition. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1130-32 (1996). For a discussion of the holding of Seminole Tribe, see supra notes
113-55 and accompanying text.
227. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
228. See id. at 99-100 (challenging California's "resale price maintenance and
price posting statutes"). After being subjected to revocation of its state business
license for violating state regulatory law regarding resale of wine, a wine wholesaler
sued to enjoin the state's wine resale pricing system. Id. The state had established
fair trade regulations by statute requiring wine producers and wholesalers to post
their prices and not deviate from them. Id. Wholesalers were thus prohibited
from selling wine at discount prices to liquor retailers. Id. at 100. Such a system of
resale price maintenance, if adopted by private businesses, has consistently been
held to be per se illegal since the Court's decision in Dr. Miles. Id. at 102 (finding
such resale arrangements are "'designed to maintain prices .... and to prevent
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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private parties acting pursuant to state regulation would be im-
mune from antitrust liability: "[f] irst, the challenged restraint must
be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state pol-
icy;' [and] second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the
State itself."229 The Midcal two-prong test applies to private parties
acting pursuant to an anticompetitive state policy, as well as to the
state government itself.230 It does not apply in full to local govern-
ment entities, nor are these entities subject to treble damages even
if they are found to be liable. 231 To obtain antitrust immunity, local
governments and private parties, acting pursuant to local regula-
tions, must prove only that the anticompetitive regulations were au-
thorized by a state policy, however, the state is not required to
actively supervise the implementation of the regulations. 23 2
competition among those who trade in [competing goods]"' (quoting Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 405 (1911))).
229. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
230. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 61 (1985) (finding "Midcals two-prong test applicable to private parties' claims
of state action immunity"); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34,
45-46 & 46 n.10 (1986) (holding Midcal test applicable to municipalities seeking
immunity under state action doctrine). In Hallie, the Court found that a munici-
pality differs from a private party "because a municipality is an arm of the state."
Hallie, 471 U.S. at 45. The Court then held that the Midcal test applicable to mu-
nicipalities is not the same as that for private parties. Id. at 45-46. According to
the Court, while a municipality must still show that it "act[ed] pursuant to clearly
articulated state policy ..... the active state supervision requirement should not be
imposed." Id. Moreover, the municipality need only show that the anticompetitive
practice was adopted at the state's "direction or authorization." Id. at 45. The
Hallie Court noted in dicta that "in cases where the actor is a state agency, it is
likely that active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not
decide that issue." Id. at 46 n.10.
231. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994)
(denying recovery for damages, interest or attorney fees from any local govern-
ment, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity). For a critique
of the law concerning municipal antitrust liability, see Herbert Hovenkamp &John
A. Mackerron, III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REv.
719, 719 (1985) (noting popularity of targeting municipal entities for collecting
antitrust damages following Supreme Court's Lafayette decision, which declared
that city's regulation of anticompetitive activities is not exempt from antitrust
liability).
232. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-40 (distinguishing cases involving antitrust ac-
tions against municipalities from those involving private parties). "[A] supervision
requirement would tend to make local government superfluous. To insist that lo-
cal government be supervised by the state ... would either make local government
largely pointless or require creation of an additional layer of state supervisors."
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 212.7a, at 203. Because neither result would
promote competition or aid the concerns of federalism, a requirement of state
supervision in this context is counterproductive. The state authorization need not
be explicit. It is sufficient if a local regulation limiting competition is the "foresee-
able result" of the state statute. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc.,
19971
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The first Midcal prong, requiring a clearly articulated state pol-
icy to replace competition with regulation, is clearly satisfied if state
legislation: (a) affirmatively mandates the anticompetitive regula-
tions and (b) declares that regulation, rather than competition, is
in the public interest and is the choice of the state. 233 This "clear
articulation" prong may also be satisfied by a state policy that "per-
mits" anticompetitive regulation. 23 4 The requisite state legislation
must show a sufficiently clear policy to supplant competition in or-
der to meet the Midcal clear articulation standard. 23 5 Any state
agency that adopts such anticompetitive regulations must have
been authorized to do so by the state.23 6 A pervasive regulatory
scheme created by the state legislature, which itself displaces free
competition, is "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed," be-
cause the natural result of such regulation is anticompetitive.23 7
499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991) (stating that suppression of competition does not have
to be explicitly permitted by statute if suppression is "foreseeable result").
233. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) (explaining that Califor-
nia marketing program was adopted by statute and then enforced through penal
sanctions for violations).
234. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 61-62 (noting that
compulsion is relevant but not prerequisite to finding state has clearly articulated
policy). Self-executing statutes may express state policy sufficiently clearly but may
or may not be sufficient to confer antitrust immunity depending upon whether
supervision is necessary to implement the requirements of the statute. See AREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 5, 1 213d, at 76-77 (noting that statutory provisions requir-
ing no state supervision may satisfy supervision element of Parker). For example, a
statute that prohibits auto dealerships from being open on Sunday or in the eve-
nings meets the requirements for state action immunity if the policy is clearly ar-
ticulated because there is nothing for the state to supervise. Such an agreement by
a group of auto dealerships, however, would be an unlawful conspiracy in restraint
of trade. See Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n v. FTC, 955 F.2d 457, 472 (6th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that hours of operation would form basis of restraint of trade
violation).
235. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (finding policy to be "forthrightly stated and clear in its
purpose"). The federal courts, therefore, must determine the intent of state legis-
lation and may have to interpret the legislative policy. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 5, 1 214a, at 81-83 (discussing requirements needed to prove intent). Intent
may be shown by: "(1) that the state or its agent intend by its action to confer
antitrust immunity, (2) that if immunity is intended by an agent of the state, the
agent must have authority to make the grant, and (3) that for immunity to apply,
the state must make a clear statement of its intent to grant it").
236. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (stating that the Sherman Act "gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state").
Agency action that is not authorized is not immune from the Sherman Act and is
ultra vires. Thus, unauthorized agency actions can be enjoined under the Ex parte
Young doctrine. For a discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine, see supra notes 89-
94 and accompanying text. SeeAREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 214a, at 80 (not-
ing that unauthorized administrative action can be enjoined).
237. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)
(concluding regulation valid under Sherman Act after rejecting argument that leg-
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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The critical inquiry is whether the anticompetitive regulations were
the "logical"238 or "foreseeable"239 result of the legislation authoriz-
ing the regulations. 240
The second prong of the Midcal test requires that the state ac-
tively supervise the private anticompetitive conduct that it autho-
rizes. Antitrust immunity granted should "shelter only the
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the judg-
ment of the State, actually further state regulatory policies." 241
Clearly, the rationale of this requirement is to promote competi-
tion, even at the expense of deference to state sovereignty. Thus,
private parties may not claim state action immunity for their an-
ticompetitive actions unless a state policy is also furthered. 242 This
islation requiring (1) notice by auto manufacturers if plans to locate new dealer-
ships into existing dealers' territories; (2) guaranteeing right of incumbent dealers
to protest; and (3) right to hearings did not contain any legislative expression of
explicit intent to supplant competition). In New Motor Vehicle Bd., the regulatory
scheme implicitly "displace [d] unfettered business freedom" and was thus immune
from challenge under the Sherman Act. Id.
238. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985) (stating
that "it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically would result from this broad
[state] authority to regulate").
239. See id. (finding that anticompetitive conduct was foreseeable result of
statute allowing municipality to refuse service in some areas); see also City of Co-
lumbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) (stating that "[i] t is
enough, we have held, if suppression of competition is the 'foreseeable result' of
what the statute authorizes," where issue was whether state zoning laws represented
sufficiently clear articulation of state policy authorizing suppression of competition
by municipality (citation omitted)).
240. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 212.3a, at 159-75 (dis-
cussing state authorization of anticompetitive activity and whether such authoriza-
tion must be express to convey state action immunity).
241. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). In Patrick, a surgeon sued
surgeons at a competing clinic after he lost his privileges at a hospital based on a
peer review action. Id. at 96-97. This peer review was initiated and conducted by
the competing surgeons. Id. The competitors claimed state action immunity by
contending that the peer review activities were undertaken pursuant to state regu-
lations creating the peer review system, which included the possibility of judicial
review of any peer review decisions. Id. at 101. In fact, the state regulations gave
neither the state judiciary nor the administrative agencies review power over pri-
vate peer review decisions. Id. at 101-04. Therefore, the Court held that the com-
petitors were not immune from antitrust liability because the state regulations did
not satisfy the active supervision prong of the Midcal test. Id. at 100.
242. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 212.7, at 217-18 (referencing
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992)) (finding that "powerful refu-
tation" to use federalism rationale in extending state action to private actors when
doing so "would not serve State's best interests"). The requirement that the state
actively supervise the private conduct serves to show that state policy, not private
interests, is being furthered and that the state is making the decisions rather than
acquiescing in an anticompetitive private conspiracy. Id. at 218. The basis for this
requirement is federalism. Id. According to Professors Areeda and Turner:
The existence of a state action immunity enables states.., to define areas
inappropriate for market control. Moreover, the adequate supervision
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requires that the supervision by the state be significant and genu-
ine; mere oversight, monitoring or acquiescence in restraints of
trade made by and for the benefit of private parties is
insufficient.243
State officials must have the authority to review, approve and
disapprove the particular anticompetitive acts of the supervisees. 244
The mere existence of governmental power to supervise, however,
is not enough. The "state officials [must] have and exercise [the]
power" and "disapprove those [acts] that fail to accord with state
policy. ' 245 Moreover, the mere potential or statutory authority of
state officials to supervise regulatory programs does not constitute
active supervision. 246 State officials must exercise a deliberative
function in regulating and may not merely acquiesce to private con-
duct.247 In F'C v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 248 the Supreme Court's
most recent state action doctrine decision, the Court rejected the
criterion ensures that state-federal conflict will be avoided in those areas
in which the state has demonstrated its commitment to a program
through its exercise of regulatory oversight. At the same time, it guaran-
tees that when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to
their own devices. Rather, immunity will be granted only when the state
has substituted its own supervision for the economic constraints of the
competitive market.
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 1 213a, at 73.
243. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987) (finding
state's failure to exert "significant control over" private parties is not active
supervision).
244. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (recognizing that state must "exercise ultimate
control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct"). A state agency or official
that was not acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy would be acting
ultra vires, would not be immune and could be enjoined. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 155-56 (1908).
245. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (concluding Midcal active supervision require-
ment not satisfied where statutory scheme provides no authority to review or over-
turn private actor decisions). The ultimate ability of the state courts to review
decisions terminating a surgeon's medical privileges pursuant to peer review regu-
lations was not sufficient "active supervision." Id. at 102.
246. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 638 (denying state action immu-
nity because state did not exercise ultimate and active control of price-fixing or
rate setting scheme of private parties). The Court found that because the prices
were only subject to "a veto if the state chooses to exercise it," it is not sufficient to
constitute active supervision. Id. This mere potential of supervision will not satisfy
the requirement of active state supervision. Id.
247. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 212.7c, at 222-26 (noting that
direct approval in form of state legislation is always sufficient to show state con-
trol). Direct supervision by the state legislature or state supreme court is clearly
sufficient but not necessary. See id. 212.7c, at 222-23 (noting situations in which
implementation of state policy may not require supervision). Active supervision by
an authorized state agency is sufficient to confer immunity. See id. (discussing situ-
ations in which supervision by municipalities is also sufficient to confer immunity).
248. 504 U.S. 621 (1992)
(Vol. 42: p. 111
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use of "some normative standard, such as efficiency," in determin-
ing if there was sufficient supervision. 249 Rather, the critical inquiry
into active supervision must be "whether the State has exercised suf-
ficient independentjudgment and control so that the details of the
rates or prices [or other aspects of the state regulatory scheme]
have been established as a product of deliberate state
intervention."250
3. Limitations and Scope of State Sovereign Immunity
The state action doctrine has additional judicially-created limi-
tations that distinguish it from broader Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity. First, it is clear that when a state acts as a sov-
ereign engaged in regulating private business, the state is immune
from antitrust liability. This state action confers antitrust immunity
on the private parties that the state regulates and actively super-
vises. If, however, the state entity acts as a market participant rather
than as the sovereign, antitrust immunity may not be available.
This distinction, which promotes competition by imposing antitrust
liability, would be irrelevant under Seminole Tribe. Under the Elev-
enth Amendment, identification of the defendant as a state is the
sole determinative factor.2 51 Similarly, under the state action doc-
trine, in the absence of any state policy superseding competition, a
state entity that entered into a conspiracy with private actors would
be exposed to the full sanctions of the antitrust laws, including
treble damages and injunctive relief.252
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,2 53 the Court
opined that:
249. See id. at 634 (concluding "purpose of the active supervision inquiry is
not to determine whether the state has met some normative standard, such as effi-
ciency, in its regulatory practices").
250. Id.
251. For a discussion of the Seminole Tribe decision and the dispositive identifi-
cation of the defendant as a state, see supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Greenwood Util. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d
1484, 1498 (5th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that conspiracy should be considered as
sham exception to state action doctrine); Englert v. City of McKeesport, 637 F.
Supp. 930, 934 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that state action immunity "does not apply
where a governmental entity has been named as co-conspirator with a private party
trying to influence it"); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Soc'y, 501
F. Supp. 970, 991-93 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (refusing to dismiss antitrust suit against
state public health commissioner, who allegedly engaged in "boycott" conspiracy
with physicians against chiropractors).
253. 499 U.S. 365 (1991). In Omni, Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (Omni),
an erector of billboards, filed an antitrust suit against the City of Columbia and its
competitor, Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("COA'), alleging that the two
parties were part of a longstanding "secret anticompetitive agreement." Id. at 367.
1997]
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The rationale of Parker was that, in light of our national
commitment to federalism, the general language of the
Sherman Act should not be interpreted to prohibit an-
ticompetitive actions by the States in their governmental
capacities as sovereign regulators .... [T]his immunity
does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a
regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a
given market.2 54
The Omni Court went on to contrast the "commercial participant"
situation, where the state resembles a private actor, with the situa-
tion where the state is acting as a sovereign in a purely regulatory
capacity, albeit as a co-conspirator with one or more of the firms
regulated.2 55 The existence of a conspiracy between a state and pri-
vate party, while anticompetitive, and indeed reprehensible, does
not transform sovereign action entitled to immunity into unpro-
tected private action. 256 Therefore, a "market participant" excep-
tion to the state action doctrine may be recognized in a future case,
although it was not adopted in Omni. Such a market participant
exception would be consistent with the theory and policy of the
state action doctrine of immunizing from antitrust liability only the
actions of the state government when acting as a sovereign.257 In
order to limit immunity to sovereign acts of state governments, re-
viewing courts must evaluate the nature and quality of the states'
acts, a task that clearly renders the state action doctrine narrower
than the scope of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Under the state action doctrine, the proper role of federal courts is
solely to verify that the defendant state is exercising its sovereign
authority in order to find or deny state action immunity.2 58 There-
COA had responded to Omni's growing business by requesting that the city coun-
cil pass zoning ordinances restricting the use of billboards. Id. at 368. In 1982, the
city council passed an ordinance requiring the council's approval for every bill-
board constructed in Columbia. Id. In addition, the council passed an ordinance
restricting the size, location and spacing of billboards. Id. Omni asserted that
these ordinances severely hampered their ability to compete. Id. at 368.
254. Id. at 374-75.
255. See id. at 374-79 (acknowledging market participant exception but re-
jecting conspiracy exception to state action immunity). The Court rejected the
court of appeals decisions which misconstrued Parker and adopted a conspiracy
exception to state action immunity. Id. at 374 (citation omitted).
256. Id. at 374-79.
257. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (discussing necessity of
state action immunity "in a dual system of government" where states may act as
sovereigns).
258. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 371-72 ("It suffices ... to conclude that here no
more is needed to establish, for Parker purposes, the city's authority to regulate
than its unquestioned zoning power over the site, location and spacing of bill-
[Vol. 42: p. 111
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fore, as the Court stated, "with the possible market participant ex-
ception, any action that qualifies as state action is 'ipso facto . . .
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.' 259 Clearly, how-
ever, the reverse is also true; any state action that does not qualify as
state action is not immune from antitrust attack in federal court.
The scope of sovereign immunity for states, state departments
and state agencies after Seminole Tribe will rely on the protections of
the Eleventh Amendment and not be limited by the state action
doctrine, which previously immunized both states and private par-
ties for anticompetitive activities undertaken pursuant to an affirm-
atively expressed state policy and which were actively supervised by
the state. Under the Eleventh Amendment, it is not relevant
whether the state has a policy to supplant competition or supervises
the markets subject to state regulation. Hereafter, broader Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity will immunize states from
suit under the antitrust laws in federal courts. Conversely, private
parties acting pursuant to state authorization, indeed, at state direc-
tive or mandate, are not sovereigns and therefore do not share in
sovereign immunity. These private actors must then continue to
seek state action immunity as their only immunity defense to allega-
tions of antitrust violations.
4. Remedies Under State Sovereign Immunity
Is there any justification based upon marketplace competition
for abandoning the fifty-year old state action doctrine in favor of
the Seminole Tribe Eleventh Amendment rule that immunizes all ac-
tions by states and their agencies? In the seminal case of Parker v.
Brown,260 the Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest
in regulating some markets and businesses, for example, the busi-
ness of insurance, common carriers, zoning and lawyers or other
boards."). The Omni Court considered and specifically rejected the argument that
the existence of the state action defense should depend upon whether the govern-
ment regulator was acting in the public interest, in which case state action immu-
nity would apply, or corruptly, in which case there would be no immunity. Id. at
376-77. Recognizing that regulation is frequently a zero-sum game, benefitting
some and disadvantaging others, the Court declined to base the state action doc-
trine on whether the regulation was, objectively or subjectively, in the public inter-
est. Id. at 377. Indeed, the Court said, "Parker was not written in ignorance of the
reality that determination of 'the public interest' in the manifold areas of govern-
ment regulation entails not merely economic and mathematical analysis but value
judgment, and it was not meant to shift that judgment from elected officials to
judges and juries." Id.
259. Id. at 379 (quoting Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)).
260. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
1997]
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professionals.2 61  State governments may thus choose to by-pass
competition and adopt a regulatory scheme that protects the public
interest in these markets, even if that scheme is anticompetitive.
Thus, the state action doctrine has the potential to injure consum-
ers and competitors by denying them the ability to recover for anti-
trust injuries caused by states acting in their sovereign capacity as
regulators of markets.
Unlike Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, the
state action doctrine balances the possible antitrust injury to con-
sumers against the competing interest of allowing states to regulate
business.2 62 Indeed, if anything can be inferred from the text and
legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it is that Con-
gress sought to promote antitrust enforcement by creating a treble
damages remedy for private plaintiffs injured by antitrust viola-
tions.2 63 In addition, "[t] he legislative history and case law indicate
that compensation [for victims of anticompetitive conspiracies] is a
goal, perhaps even the dominant goal, of antitrust's damages rem-
edy."2 64 Thus, the state action doctrine requires a balancing of two
competing considerations: competition and state sovereignty. The
interests of consumers and other plaintiffs injured by restraints of
trade can only be outweighed by a considered state governmental
decision to substitute regulation for competition. The Eleventh
Amendment, by contrast, is an absolute bar to the exercise of fed-
261. For a discussion of the Parker decision, see supra notes 180-215 and ac-
companying text.
262. See Harris & Kenny, supra note 27, at 651 (discussing how state action
doctrine "immunizes activities that may restrain competition necessary for the car-
rying out of bono fide state-related activities, but it does not immunize unauthor-
ized anticompetitive conduct by state agencies and officials"). Harris and Kenny
further contend that:
No legitimate state interest would be served, however, by immunizing
state conduct violative of the antitrust laws which is not otherwise
shielded by the state action doctrine. The application of [E]leventh
[A]mendment immunity to private federal antitrust actions would erase
forty years of case law that has developed a proper balance between the
interests of states and private citizens and would deprive those citizens of
any forum in which to pursue the private right of action conferred on
them by Congress.
Id. For a contrasting discussion of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra notes 19-94
and accompanying text.
263. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (establishing treble
damages remedy for violation of antitrust laws). The treble damages remedy was
extended to violations by the United States in its proprietary capacity, under an
amendment to the Clayton Act in 1990. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15a.
264. Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages ?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 122 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Lynn H. Pasahow, Treble-
Damages Remedy, 13 ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L. 16-21 (1986) (noting purposes of treble
damages as indicated by historical congressional material).
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eral jurisdiction over states and engages in no weighing of these
competing interests.
The issue of a state's antitrust liability is not purely academic.
If liability on the part of a state actor is found, the extent and form
of relief may be substantially limited. While the availability of in-
junctive relief against state entities for antitrust violations has been
upheld by the Supreme Court,265 a majority of the Supreme Court
has not decided whether treble damages may be awarded against a
state government entity.266 Moreover, the few decisions by lower
courts on this issue are conflicting. 267
265. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975) (referencing
state bar as state actor and county bar as private actor then imposing injunctive
measures against state and county bar association for violation of antitrust laws).
But see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (characterizing
Goldfarb as concerning only private parties that were claiming state action immu-
nity). For a discussion of the factual background of Goldfarb, see supra note 153
and accompanying text. Professors Areeda and Turner have argued that the bar
officials in Goldfarb were not government employees or officials, but rather private
individuals. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 1 217a, at 107-08. Thus, "the Court
was concerned with 'essentially a private anticompetitive activity' being conducted
by those partially garbed as a state agency." Id. (footnote omitted). Areeda and
Turner further opined that government entities and officials should only be poten-
tially subject to equitable remedies but never treble damages liability. Id. at 102. If
the defendants in Goldfarb were really not state actors, then a precedent for hold-
ing a state liable for injunctive relief may not even exist.
266. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389, 401-02
(1978) (5-4 decision) (finding previous decisions do not "necessarily require the
conclusion that remedies appropriate to redress violations by private corporations
would be equally appropriate for municipalities, nor do we decide any question of
remedy in this case"), affg 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976). In his dissent, Justice
Stewart recognized "the staggering costs" that municipalities will be paying due to
alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The precise issue
before the Court was the legal standard for antitrust liability of a municipality.
Because the district court had granted the defendant cities' motion to dismiss, no
decision on the merits or damage award against the cities was at issue. The cities
argued, however, that the antitrust laws did not allow civil damages or criminal
liability to be imposed upon government entities. Id. at 394. Writing for the plu-
rality, Justice Brennan disagreed, stating that municipalities had the potential to
"distort[ ] ... the rational and efficient allocation of resources, and the efficiency
of free markets which the regime of competition embodied in the antitrust laws is
thought to engender" and that this would be a "serious chink in the armor of
antitrust protection." Id. at 408. Conversely, Justice Stewart argued that damages
would be improper, because municipalities and their citizens could be exposed to
massive treble damage awards that they could ill afford. Id. at 440-43 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
267. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing
dismissal of treble damages claim against municipalities and local officials); Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (citing Parker line of
cases in deciding that governmental action is not necessarily immune from anti-
trust laws); Ajax Aluminum v. Goodwill Indus. of Muskegon County, 564 F. Supp.
628, 631 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding that state department actively supervised pro-
gram in question, that legislative authorization was not necessary because defend-
ant was not private party but state itself, and deciding that state, acting in its
1997]
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Commentators have argued that neither government entities
nor officials should be subject to criminal liability or antitrust civil
damages because "[ilt is hard to believe that Congress meant to
transfer treble damages from the citizenry to those business enter-
prises which claim antitrust injury as a result of a government
agency's economic policies."268 Moreover, it is argued that injunc-
tive relief would be sufficient to make plaintiffs whole. Commenta-
tors have also argued that if it is not possible to construe the
antitrust laws to bar damages as a remedy against the acts of govern-
ment entities and officials, yet still allow equitable remedies, then
these entities and officials should be entirely immune from any
remedy sought by a plaintiff.269 Nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act limits the type of relief that may be ordered against
governmental entities. 270
IV. JUDIcLAL ANALYSIS OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE
ACTION DEFENSES IN ANTITRUST CASES
Since its adoption, the Eleventh Amendment has been a poten-
tial defense for defendant states and state entities in antitrust cases.
Indeed, a number of federal antitrust cases against states have been
dismissed, in whole or in part, on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In addition, a number of state defendants have based motions to
dismiss federal antitrust claims against them upon the immunity of
both the Eleventh Amendment and the state action doctrine. A
sovereign capacity, is immune from antitrust suit). But see New Mexico v. American
Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363, 367-71 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that "sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act do not apply to the activities of a state" (footnote omitted)); cf
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 207 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (overturn-
ing $28 million treble damage jury award against county, village and local officials
based on finding of state action immunity), aff'd, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 1217, at 102 (citation omitted). By the
time that the Areeda and Turner treatise was published in 1978, the Supreme
Court had already held that Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity when it decided Parden and Fitzpatrick. For a discussion of the Parden
and Fitzpatrick decisions, see supra notes 56-62, 68-75 and accompanying text, re-
spectively. Areeda and Turner recognized that the Eleventh Amendment may be a
significant bar to the award of damages against states and state officials. SeeAREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 5, 217, at 102 (emphasizing that punitive sanctions against
state officials should be barred).
269. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 217a2, at 105 (noting that, regard-
less of which interpretation of Sherman Act is followed, state agencies or employ-
ees would be immune from treble damages).
270. But see id. 217al, at 103 (concluding, in defiance of statute's language,
"the inappropriateness of the Sherman [Antitrust] Act's criminal and monetary
penalties for state defendants meant that the Act was never meant to apply at all.
(citing American Petrofina, 501 F.2d at 363)). For a further discussion of American
Petrofina, see infra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
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survey of such cases over the past decade, however, demonstrates
that the courts that ruled on these motions based their decisions on
either or both grounds without a discernable pattern of analysis.2 71
Although state entities have had the option of pleading both the
Eleventh Amendment and state action immunity, the number of
antitrust decisions that discuss both doctrines is surprisingly, rela-
tively small, and generally, these decisions do not discuss the rela-
tionship between the two doctrines of state sovereign immunity.
A. Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has not focused on either the interplay
between the state action doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment or
the inherent conflicts between the two doctrines in antitrust cases
with state actor defendants. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2 72 a
state bar association argued to the district court that it was immune
from antitrust liability under the Eleventh Amendment.2 73 The Dis-
trict Court, however, based its decision denying such immunity
under the Parker state action doctrine. 274 The Supreme Court,
therefore, had no opportunity to consider the Eleventh Amend-
ment argument and left that analysis to the district court on re-
mand.275 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,2 7 6 the
plurality correctly observed that the state action doctrine was based
on deference to state sovereignty. 277 The plurality stated that this
sovereignty could be limited only by Congress, and that such a con-
271. Even if the state actor failed to satisfy the state action doctrine requiring
that it act pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy and actively supervise, the
Eleventh Amendment may require dismissal or summary judgment for the state.
272. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
273. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 496 (1973) (noting stip-
ulation that "Virginia State Bar is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court
of Virginia" and that "such an agency was surely never intended to be included
among those liable for damages under [the Clayton Act]"), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
274. Id. (finding that in state bar's minor role, it had engaged in "state ac-
tion"). For a discussion of the factual background of Goldfarb, see supra note 153
and accompanying text.
275. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792 n.22 (recognizing that state bar believes it
has Eleventh Amendment immunity under Edelman v. Johnson, 415 U.S. 651
(1974)).
276. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
277. See id. at 411-13 (recognizing importance of state sovereignty dual system
of government). The Lafayette Court explained that "'[in] unicipal corporations
are instrumentalities of the State for the convenient administration of government
within their limits."' Id. at 413 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883)). The Court then concluded that "the actions of
municipalities may reflect state policy." Id.
1997]
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gressional purpose would not lightly be implied.2 78 The dissent,
however, presciently observed the distinction between the two doc-
trines, by stating:
The plurality today advances two reasons for holding
nonetheless that the Parker doctrine is inapplicable to mu-
nicipal governments. First, the plurality notes that munici-
palities cannot claim the State's sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment. But this is hardly relevant to
the question of whether they are within the reach of the
Sherman Act. That question must be answered by refer-
ence to congressional intent, and not constitutional prin-
ciples that apply in entirely different situations. And if
constitutional analogies are to be looked to, a decision
much more directly related to this case than the Eleventh
Amendment is National League of Cities v. Usery .... That
case, like this one, involved an exercise of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause, and held that States and
their political subdivisions must be given equal
deference.279
Most recently, in a dissenting opinion to City of Colunbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,280 Justice Stevens briefly mentioned the
Eleventh Amendment by noting that, while states are protected
from suit, municipalities do not share a similar protection. 281
B. Analysis of Circuit Court Decisions
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Federal Circuits have
ruled upon antitrust cases in which both the Eleventh Amendment
and state action doctrine were raised as defenses. A review of these
decisions reveals that no pattern or theoretical analysis in the rea-
soning. The decisions may be based on either or both grounds, but
278. Id. at 398-400. Defendant was not a state entity, but a municipality that
had set up an allegedly anticompetitive system for the sale of lightbulbs to custom-
ers of a regulated utility. Id. at 392. The plurality stated that municipalities are
shielded under the state action doctrine only if they are acting pursuant to a state
policy. Id. at 393-94. The majority rejected any relationship to the Eleventh
Amendment, pointing out that cities are not sovereign, and therefore, are not enti-
ted to Eleventh Amendment protection. Id. at 412 (citing Lincoln County v. Lun-
ning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890)).
279. Id. at 430 (footnote and citations omitted).
280. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
281. See id. at 390 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'States are protected by the
Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not..."' (quoting Will v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989))).
170 [Vol. 42: p. !111
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in general, these courts do not discuss the relationship between the
two doctrines.
The two reported antitrust cases from the Third Circuit, involv-
ing allegedly anticompetitive activity prompted by state action, did
not directly confront the interplay between the state action doc-
trine and the Eleventh Amendment.2 82 In the case giving the ful-
lest treatment of the two doctrines, Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing
Ass'n,283 the Third Circuit decided that the requirements for state
action immunity were satisfied and thus declined to reach the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity argument that had been raised by the
defendants.28 4
In the most recent Fifth Circuit antitrust case, Green v. State Bar
of Texas,285 the court found that the defendant state entity and indi-
vidual state officials were immune under both the state action doc-
trine and the Eleventh Amendment.28 6 The court, however, did
not discuss any differences or potential conflict between the two
theories of sovereign immunity.28 7 In Jefferson County Pharmaceutical
Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories,288 the Fifth Circuit did affirm a lower
court finding that protected the defendant state board on both an-
282. See In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d
760, 765 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding school boards do not enjoy Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity like states); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 677 F.2d 992, 993
n.3, 995-97 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding state action immunity based on satisfaction of
Midcal test, thus court did not reach Eleventh Amendment argument). In In re
Real Estate Title & Settlement Services, 869 F.2d at 760, the Third Circuit briefly dis-
cussed the Eleventh Amendment when it found that school boards lack the protec-
tions that states enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 765 n.3 (citing
Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-82 (1977)). The
court concluded that "although school districts are related to the state, the
Supreme Court has declared that they are not the alter ego of the state, and thus
the Constitution can apply to them differently." Id. (citation omitted).
283. 677 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1982).
284. See id. at 995-97 (declining to reach Eleventh Amendment immunity is-
sue after holding state racing commission rules setting jockey fees are protected by
state action immunity).
285. 27 F.3d 1083 (5th Cir. 1994).
286. See id. at 1087-88 (determining that state committees and its officials
were immune under state action doctrine and Eleventh Amendment because par-
ties acted under state authority).
287. In Green, an insurance adjuster sued the state bar association's unauthor-
ized practice committee, its chair and the bar counsel, among others, for antitrust
violation. Id. at 1085-86. The court held that the state committee was not liable
for the antitrust claims because it was authorized to pursue the questioned action.
Id. at 1087. The plaintiff could not prevail against the committee's counsel for the
antitrust claims because he was acting in his official capacity. Id. Finally, the court
held that the defendant state officials were immune under the Eleventh Amend-
ment because they were "deemed [not to be] 'persons' subject to suit .... Id. at
1087-88 (citation omitted).
288. 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
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titrust and constitutional sovereign immunity grounds. 289 A trade
association of pharmacies had sued government entities and drug
producers alleging violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, based
upon price discrimination in sales to certain pharmacies. 290 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the lower court's dismissal on
the ground that the state board was immune from suit for damages
under the Eleventh Amendment, but was not immune from a claim
for prospective injunctive relief.2 91 In dicta, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the district court's decision that the Robinson-Patman Act
was inapplicable to sales made to governmental institutions, includ-
ing the university hospital in this case. 292 The Supreme Court re-
versed the Fifth Circuit on the merits of the antitrust issue without
considering the Eleventh Amendment. 293
The Sixth Circuit has applied the state action doctrine to im-
munize state defendants from antitrust liability in two cases and the
Eleventh Amendment in a third antitrust case, without discussing in
any decision the different theories underlying the two sovereign im-
munity doctrines. In Allied Artists v. Rhodes,294 the court held that
the state action doctrine protected the State of Ohio from an anti-
trust suit, but the Eleventh Amendment did not protect the Ohio
governor from an injunction.2 95 The court opined that the state's
289. Id. at 93, 99, 103 n.10.
290. See id. at 98 (claiming that hospitals ran "favored" pharmacies in viola-
tion of Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(b), 21(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995)).
291. Id. at 98-99. The court held that the defendant state entity was the
equivalent of the state and thus was immune under the Eleventh Amendment. See
id. at 99 ("The claims against the Board must therefore be treated as equivalent to
claims against the State itself."). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit determined that
the state neither waived the immunity nor consented to suit. Id. As the court
noted, however, the immunity was limited to the plaintiff's suit for damages against
the state university. See id. (stating that immunity does not extend to prospective
injunctive relief).
292. The Court distinguished its immunity decision based upon the Robin-
son-Patman Act from the state action doctrine, which it described as dealing only
with "'state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser-
vice."' Id. at 103 n.10 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978)). The Court observed that the rationale of the state
action doctrine was not inconsistent with its decision because the state was seeking
to promote competition. Id.
293. SeeJefferson County Pharm. Ass'n Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S.
at 170-71 (finding no exemption from antitrust laws).
294. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
295. See id. at 662 (determining that state's motion picture licensing act was
within state action doctrine because first prong of Midcal, clearly articulated policy,
was present and that second prong was not necessary because regulation was self-
executing). In Allied Artists, the Governor of Ohio was sued to enjoin enforcement
of a law prohibiting blind bidding in the marketing of movies, alleging that the
statute violated antitrust laws, among other things. Id. at 658-59. The trial court
found no antitrust violation. Id. at 659.
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immunity was found because the state policy to replace competition
was clearly articulated in the statute and the statute was self-execut-
ing, making active state supervision unnecessary. 296 The court
stated, however, that the governor was involved with the enforce-
ment of the statute.2 97 Thus, he could be sued for injunctive relief
under the Ex parte Young doctrine.2 98 The court failed to explain
why it applied the state action doctrine analysis to one defendant
and the Eleventh Amendment analysis to the other defendant. In
Gross v. University of Tennessee,299 the court affirmed dismissal of the
defendant state university hospital pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment without discussing the possibility of state action immu-
nity, even though both sovereign immunity claims had been argued
by the government defendants.300 Finally, in Hybud Equipment Corp.
v. City of Akron,301 the court decided that the defendant city was
exempt from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.30 2
Several. years earlier, in a previous decision of this case, the Sixth
296. Id. at 662.
297. See id. at 665 n.5 (determining that governor had sufficient connection
with enforcement of law such that he falls outside of Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion and may be sued for declaratory and injunctive relief).
298. See id. (finding that governor is outside scope of Eleventh Amendment
immunity and eligible for declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young).
299. 620 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
300. See id. at 110 (deciding to dismiss claims without reaching Eleventh
Amendment or state action arguments). In Gross, two medical school professors
sued the university in challenging their dismissals on antitrust and civil rights
grounds. Id. At the time of their hiring, the professors signed "medical practice
agreements." Id. Later in their employment, the professors refused to resign the
agreements. Id. Thereafter, the university terminated them. Id.
301. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984). In Hybud, the Sixth Circuit upheld the City
of Akron's ordinance that created a monopoly for garbage collection and elimi-
nated competition. Id. at 964. The City took these actions in order to ensure the
viability of its own $55 million recycling plant. Id. at 951-53. The ousted competi-
tors then sued under constitutional and antitrust grounds. Id. at 953. After the
Sixth Circuit upheld these actions by finding that the City operated under the state
action doctrine, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision to be con-
sidered in light of the recent decision in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 455 U.S.
931, 931 (1982) (citing City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 40). The City of Boulder decision
cautioned against finding that a city was engaged in state action "unless [the ac-
tion] constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed state policy." City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52
(emphasis added). On remand, the district court again upheld the City's action as
protected under the state action doctrine. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of
Akron, No. CIVA.C78-1733A, 1983 WL 1814 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 1983), affd, 742
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984). The district court's decision was then affirmed for the
second time by the Sixth Circuit, notwithstanding the City of Boulder decision.
Hybud Equipment Corp., 742 F.2d at 964.
302. See Hybud Equipment Corp., 742 F.2d at 964 (upholding City's ordinance
creating monopoly for garbage collection).
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Circuit upheld these same actions taken by the City.30 3 At that
time, the Sixth Circuit also found state action to exist but noted
that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply.30 4 After remand of
this case, the City's actions were affirmed in the decision above. 30 5
In the only reported Seventh Circuit case discussing both the
antitrust immunity and constitutional sovereign immunity doc-
trines, Crosetto v. State Bar of Wisconsin,3 0 6 the court noted that state
bar associations have been recognized as arms of the state for Elev-
enth Amendment purposes. 30 7 The court also discussed the status
of state bar associations under the antitrust state action doctrine,
recognizing that bar associations had been held to be entities of the
state entitled to immunity under this antitrust doctrine.3 0 8
Whether this association was entitled to immunity was a question of
fact for the trial court, so the immunity issue was remanded to the
district court.3 0 9 Significantly, the Seventh Circuit raised the Elev-
enth Amendment issue sua sponte because the power of the federal
courts to exercise power over parties is jurisdictional. 310
303. See Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195-97 (1981)
(determining that City's acts were protected under state action doctrine because
garbage collection is traditional local government function), vacated, 455 U.S. 931
(1982).
304. See id. at 1196 (discussing Tenth and Eleventh Amendments).
305. Hybud, 742 F.2d at 964 (upholding City's ordinance creating monopoly
for garbage collection).
306. 12 F.3d 1396 (7th Cir. 1993).
307. See id. at 1401 (recognizing that "suit against a state bar association, as a
general matter, may constitute a suit against the state for sovereign immunity pur-
poses"). In Crosetto, a lawyer sued the state bar, its director and the members of the
state supreme court challenging the compulsory membership requirement and
dues under the antitrust laws and First Amendment. Id. at 1397. On this issue, the
Seventh Circuit found the status of the state bar to be a question of fact. Id. at
1402. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the case against the
state bar to the district court. Id.
308. See id. at 1401 (quoting Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 n.18
(1989)) (finding that "the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the
State's power to protect the public"). The Third Circuit further explained that:
"'Few other professions are as close to the core of the State's power to protect the
public. Nor is any trade or other profession as essential to the primary governmen-
tal function of administering justice."' Id. (quoting Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 n.18).
309. See id. at 1402 (remanding for district court to determine whether "the
suit against Wisconsin State Bar Association is properly considered a suit against
the state qua state"). The Seventh Circuit listed several factors for the district court
to consider: (1) whether the state supreme court had ultimate control; (2)
whether the bar association acted as an agent of the state supreme court; and (3)
whether a judgment against the state bar would be paid by the state treasury. Id.
310. See id. at 1401 (stating that "when a state citizen sues an entity that hap-
pens to be an arm of that citizen's home state, then a federal court, under Hans
and its progeny, ordinarily lacks subject matter jurisdiction" (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 42: p. I111
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The only Eighth Circuit decision, O'Connor v. Jones,31' was de-
cided upon Eleventh Amendment immunity and not on the basis of
antitrust state action immunity.3 12 The court, however, failed to dis-
cuss the relationship between the two doctrines.
The Ninth Circuit has decided the largest number of cases that
discuss both immunity doctrines.313 The most searching analysis
came more than twenty years ago in State of New Mexico v. American
Petrofina, Inc.31 4 In deciding that Parker conferred absolute immu-
nity on states under the antitrust laws, the American Petrofina court
stated that "we have no basis for concluding that Congress intended
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to apply to some acts of states
but not to others."315 The court noted that "the Eleventh Amend-
ment would cause serious difficulties for such a suit against a state.
Without a clear indication from Congress, we are reluctant to im-
pute to Congress an intent that would raise such substantial consti-
tutional problems."3 16 Thus, the Ninth Circuit was suggesting that
311. 946 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1991).
312. See id. at 1397-98 (deciding state attorney general was entitled to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity and thus claim of antitrust violations never reached).
In O'Connor, a state prisoner challenged the appointment of his court-appointed
lawyer in a separate suit alleging inadequate medical treatment in a state-run
prison. Id. at 1396. The prisoner challenged the legal appointment because mem-
bers of the lawyer's firm had been previously appointed as "special assistant attor-
neys general" for the state in other cases representing state employees. Id. at 1396-
97. The district court found that the state attorney general had violated state law
in making such legal appointments. Id. In reversing the district court's decision to
deny the prisoner's request to dismiss his attorney, the Eighth Circuit bypassed the
prisoner's claims that such hirings resulted in violations of the antitrust laws. Id. at
1397. Instead, the court found that the plaintiff's motion would be sustained on
other grounds so that the court did not decide the issue relating to antitrust laws
and state action. Id. at 1397 & n.1. The Third Circuit found that the Missouri
Attorney General was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1399 (cit-
ing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (conclud-
ing that "a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official
responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh
Amendment")).
313. Not all of these cases were decided on the merits of the immunity doc-
trines. See Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976
(9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing claims because plaintiff failed to present "any material
issue of fact on the merits of their antitrust claims"). In Ferguson, an unsuccessful
bidder for the rights to hold a trade show sued the winning bidder and the state
university for violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 978-79. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of the complaint and noted that because the plaintiffs had failed
to present any evidence, it did not have to consider Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine or state action immunity. Id. at 984 n.5.
314. 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
315. Id. at 372.
316. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted). In American Petrofina, the state sued Shell
Oil Co. and five other firms for price-fixing and bid rigging in the sale of asphalt to
the state and its political subdivisions. Id. at 364. Defendants counterclaimed, al-
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the scope of the state action doctrine should be as broad, if not
identical to the Eleventh Amendment immunity. In later decisions,
the Supreme Court failed to adopt this expansive view of the state
action doctrine. However, the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized
that there are differences between Eleventh Amendment immunity
and antitrust state action immunity that can affect the outcome of
cases.3 17 In a more recent case, Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Com-
mission,318 the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant state failed to
satisfy the requirements for state action immunity because it did not
actively supervise its regulatory program. 319 The court did not ad-
dress Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity because the
state had raised that issue for the first time on appeal. °20 In later
decisions, the court applied the state action doctrine or the Elev-
enth Amendment, or both, with little analysis of the complexities of
and differences between the two immunity doctrines. In one case
the court based its decision on the Eleventh Amendment and there-
fore found that consideration of the state action defense was unnec-
essary.3 21 In other cases, however, the court based its decision on
leging that the state and its political subdivisions had conspired unlawfully to fix
the purchase price of asphalt in violation of the antitrust laws. Id. The district
court dismissed the counterclaim under the state action doctrine, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Id. at 372. The continued validity of the court's reasoning is
questionable, however, because the case preceded major developments in the state
action doctrine, including Goldfarb.
317. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 114 (1980) (finding California's wine pricing system violates Sherman
Act).
318. 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982).
319. See id. at 1224-27 (determining that state supervision requirement was
not satisfied because state neither established nor reviewed reasonableness of price
schedules). Analyzing the two-prong Midcal test for state action immunity, the
court reviewed the state regulations requiring that all liquor prices be publicly
posted and not subject to discount. Id. at 1223, 1226-27. The state simply required
that prices be posted but did not review those prices to determine whether they
were reasonable. The Ninth Circuit found that the state did not adequately super-
vise the price regulation. Id. at 1227. Thus, the regulation failed the second prong
of the Midcal test. Id. (citing Midca 445 U.S. at 97).
320. See id. at 1227 n.4 (remanding Eleventh Amendment argument). The
Ninth Circuit noted that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against the
private defendants and remanded this constitutional issue to the district court. Id.
State action immunity against private parties does not bar an action like the plain-
tiff's. Id.
321. See Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 379-83
(9th Cir. 1993) (determining that because Congress did not abrogate constitu-
tional immunity in federal law and railroad was an "arm of the state," corporation
was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). In Alaska Cargo, a company that
services rail cars sued a railroad corporation for alleged antitrust violations, defa-
mations and breach of contract. Id. at 378-79. Affirming the lower court's deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit held that because the defendant satisfied the most critical
factor-"whether ajudgment would impact the state treasury"-the defendant was
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both doctrines.3 22 In no instance did the court discuss the differ-
ences between the two doctrines.
In the only reported Tenth Circuit case where both immunity
doctrines were raised, Howard v. State Department of Highways of Colo-
rado,323 the court based its decision with respect to the antitrust is-
sues solely upon the state action doctrine and found that the state
defendants were immune.324
The Eleventh Circuit has decided two antitrust cases on the
basis of the state action doctrine after declining to consider the is-
sue of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. In Askew v. DCH
Regional Health Care Authority,325 the court decided that the author-
ity was a governmental entity that was immune under the state ac-
tion doctrine and thus the court did not discuss the Eleventh
an "arm of the state" and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at
380, 382. Because the case was decided under the Eleventh Amendment, the
Ninth Circuit found it unnecessary to discuss the state action issue. Id. at 383 n.4.
322. In Boulware v. State of Nevada, Department of Human Resources, 960 F.2d 793
(9th Cir. 1992), a doctor sued the state and a hospital for antitrust violations sur-
rounding the doctor's alleged failure to obtain a certificate of need regulating the
purchase of a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) unit. Id. at 795. The doctor
went bankrupt and brought this federal action. Id. The district court dismissed
the state department pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and the other defend-
ants based on the Noerr-Pennington immunity. Id. at 796. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the private defendants because its monopolistic
activities were protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See id. at 799-800
(determining that even though defendant took part in monopolistic activities, that
does not "place it" beyond Noerr-Pennington's protection).
In Charley's Radio Taxi Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.
1987), a taxi fleet operator sued the state, a taxi association and individual taxi
owners challenging the appointment of the association as the exclusive provider of
service at the airport. Id. at 872. The court held that the state and the state's
department of transportation were immune under the Eleventh Amendment be-
cause the state did not waive its immunity. Id. at 873-74. It affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the action against the state director under the state action doc-
trine. Id. at 876. The court determined that because the director acted according
to lawful authority, his acts were that of the state and protected under the state
action doctrine. Id. Finally, like the state director,)the private taxi company was
protected under the state action doctrine because it was granted an exclusive mo-
nopoly by the state. Id.
323. 478 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1973).
324. See id. at 585 (holding that "[w]hen a monopoly or restraint of trade is a
result of valid state action, there is no antitrust violation"). In Howard, the owner
of a resort sued the state for antitrust and other claims, including the First Amend-
ment, challenging the Colorado Outdoor Advertising Act, which prohibited him
from erecting roadside signs. Id. at 582. The federal district court abstained from
exercising jurisdiction while proceedings were pending in state court and did not
rule on the state defendant's motion to dismiss under the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. Affirming the district court's dismissal for want ofjurisdiction, the court deter-
mined that, under Parker, a monopoly or restraint of trade is not a violation of
antitrust laws if the action was the "result of valid state action." Id. at 585.
325. 995 F.2d 1033 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Amendment.326 In Abramson v. Gonzalez,327 several unlicensed psy-
chologists sued a state official for interfering with their commercial
speech in challenging the state licensing scheme and regulation by
the state board. 328 The psychologists then sought to amend the
complaint to re-allege the antitrust count.329 On appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit, on its own motion, refused to consider the defense of
Eleventh Amendment immunity because the defense had not been
previously raised and denied.3 30
The Federal Circuit, in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,3 31 held
that the state university in the case was not immune under the Elev-
enth Amendment for alleged patent violations.33 2 The court dis-
missed the plaintiffs antitrust claim because the plaintiff failed to
plead facts which could have been found to be a violation of anti-
trust law.
3 3 3
326. See id. at 1037-41 (holding that state hospital authority was political sub-
division of state and that it acted, when purchasing hospital in question, according
to clearly expressed state policy; thus, it was entitled to state action immunity
under Town of Hattie).
In Askew, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state authority from acquiring a
health care facility. Id. at 1035. Noting that neither the Supreme Court nor an-
other "Eleventh Circuit case had held that a political subdivision that is not a mu-
nicipality ... is subject to the two-prong test of Midcal," the court determined that
the proper test was that articulated in Town of Hattie. Id. at 1037-38. The court
determined that the state authority was a political subdivision. Id. at 1039. It then
found that the state authority acted pursuant to an affirmative state policy because
the legislature had stated that "publicly-owned hospitals played a very significant
role in providing health care to the poor." Id. at 1040. Thus, the court held that
the authority was immune from antitrust liability. Id. at 1041.
327. 949 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
328. Id. at 1570-72.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1570 n.1.
331. 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
332. See id. at 948-49 (holding that Congress specifically intended to abrogate
state immunity for violations to federal laws regarding patent owned by states). In
Genentech, the plaintiff sued the state university and Lilly for declaratory judgment
over licensing arrangements concerning a patent held by the university. Id. at 935.
The complaint was based on antitrust, contract and tort claims. Id. The district
court determined that the university was an arm of the state and entitled to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. Id. at 939. The Federal Circuit, however, determined
that Congress explicitly abrogated state immunity for violations under a specific
patent law. Id. at 942.
333. See id. at 941-44 (finding that plaintiff failed to provide facts "which if
proved [would have] constitute[d] violation of the antitrust laws"). After describ-
ing the state action doctrine, the court determined that the antitrust challenges to
the university's exclusive licenses of its patents were insufficient as a matter of law.
Id. at 949. Thus, the court did not discuss the state action doctrine's app~icability
to the case. Id.
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C. Analysis of District Court Decisions
The district courts in the pre-Seminole Tribe era have employed
similarly inconsistent analyses in antitrust cases where both Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity and the state action doctrine
were, or could have been, pleaded as defenses. In cases involving
multiple causes of action, many courts have applied an Eleventh
Amendment analysis to the nonantitrust claims and a state action
analysis to the antitrust claims, without explaining why the Eleventh
Amendment analysis was not used in connection with the antitrust
counts of the complaint.33 4 These courts did not indicate whether
there would have been a different result under the two methods of
analysis. One district court, however, has reached both the Elev-
enth Amendment and state action issues in an antitrust case.
335
This court decided that the defendant was a state agency for anti-
trust immunity purposes but was not a state agency for the purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment. 336 Other courts have determined an-
334. See, e.g., Crefasi v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm'n, No. CIV.A.94-0653,
1994 WL 548205, at *1-5 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1994) (dismissing § 1983 claims against
state commission and officials pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity and
granting summary judgment based on state action immunity for antitrust claims);
McFarlane v. Folsom, 854 F. Supp. 862, 872-73, 878-79 (1994) (dismissing claims
against state's legislature, supreme court and board of examiners, among others,
by plaintiff who failed state bar exam several times under state action doctrine for
antitrust claims and under Eleventh Amendment for civil rights claim); Ralph Ro-
senberg Court Reporters, Inc. v. Fazio, 811 F. Supp. 1432, 1439-40 (D. Haw. 1993)
(denying antitrust claims under state action doctrine where state supreme court
promulgated certification rules for court reporters and discussing Eleventh
Amendment in context of freedom of speech claims); California Int'l Chem. Co. v.
Neptune Pool Serv., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1530, 1532-34 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (denying
motion to dismiss for racketeering count because factual record was not clear
whether actions of chairperson of state board were within Eleventh Amendment
immunity and denying motion to dismiss antitrust claims because there was rea-
sonable inference that lobbying eforts of defendant chairperson were within sham
exception of Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Board of Governors v. Helpingstine, 714
F. Supp. 167, 174-76 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (dismissing counterclaim against state uni-
versity officials under Eleventh Amendment immunity for alleged state unfair com-
petition violations and under state action doctrine for federal antitrust claim);
Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 695 F. Supp. 253, 279-80, 282-86 (N.D.
Miss. 1988) (dismissing claims challenging trade association's provision of multiple
listings only to members, price-fixing and governmental retaliation against state
real estate commission and its officers under Eleventh Amendment for illegal due
process, equal protection and First Amendment violations and under state action
doctrine for alleged antitrust violations).
335. See Pennsylvania Coach Lines v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 874 F.
Supp. 666, 669 n.1, 670-71 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that defendant agency was
not state agency under Eleventh Amendment but was state agency under state ac-
tion doctrine).
336. Id. In Pennsylvania Coach Lines, a private bus company alleged antitrust
violations against defendant port authority because the authority appointed a com-
petitor as the exclusive carrier between an airport and the downtown area. Id. at
1997]
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titrust claims based on the antitrust state action defense and de-
clined to reach the constitutional immunity question.33 7 A smaller
number of courts have dismissed the antitrust claims on the alterna-
tive grounds of antitrust immunity or constitutional sovereign im-
munity.3 3 8 At least one court has used the state action doctrine to
668. The court denied the port authority's motion for summary judgment under
the Eleventh Amendment based on the Third Circuit's holding that a regional
authority was not the "state" for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at
669 n.1 (citing Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 812-21 (3d
Cir. 1991)). The court, however, then held that the port authority was a state
entity for the purposes of the antitrust laws and was entitled to state action immu-
nity, determining that:
The fact that this Court has held that defendant is not a state agency for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a determination
that defendant is a state agency for purposes of the state action exemp-
tion in light of the particularized factors that courts consider when deter-
mining whether an entity is a state agency under the Eleventh
Amendment. Because the state action exemption is founded on princi-
ples of federalism and state sovereignty, this Court. . . holds that defend-
ant is a state agency for purposes of the state action exemption.
Id. at 670-71 (citations omitted). Conversely, in Vartan v. Harristown Development
Corp., 661 F. Supp. 596 (M.D. Pa. 1987), another district court used the opposite
reasoning by deciding that it was appropriate to use federal Eleventh Amendment
precedent to determine whether the defendant was the "state" for purposes of
antitrust immunity because antitrust laws are federal statutes. See id. at 602 (noting
that although state court decisions determining whether state agency is political
organization of state is important, court stated that for antitrust law it would follow
circuit court test).
337. See, e.g., Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 775 F. Supp. 1096, 1101
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding discussion of Eleventh Amendment immunity unneces-
sary because bar disciplinary proceedings were based on articulated policy of state
supreme court and adequately supervised by state supreme court, thus satisfying
two-prong test of Midcal); Cowboy Book, Ltd. v. Board of Regents for Agric. &
Mechanical College, 728 F. Supp. 1518, 1520-24 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (granting state
university's motion to dismiss against private bookstore's claim of unfair competi-
tion under state action doctrine and determining consideration of Eleventh
Amendment unnecessary); Midwest Constr. Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Labor, 684 F.
Supp. 991, 993-96 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining that state entities were immune
from antitrust claims under state action doctrine and thus did not reach Eleventh
Amendment defense). It should be noted that the above mentioned cases were
decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, which centered its
decision on the importance of the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1123-32 (1996) (determining that Eleventh Amendment
forbids Congress from allowing suits by private parties against unconsenting
states).
338. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical and Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. University of Utah,
801 F. Supp. 508, 510-14 (D. Utah 1990) (dismissing claim of unfair competition
brought by private health care firm against state university and state officials based
on both Eleventh Amendment and state action immunities); H.E. Duncan & Sons,
Inc. v. Finance Exch. Co. of Pa., No. CIVA.86-1107, 1986 WL 9258, at "1, 4-5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 21, 1986) (dismissing all claims by grocery store against state for alleged
violation of food stamp regulations and antitrust laws under Eleventh Amendment
immunity and dismissing antitrust claims against state entities and private parties
under state action doctrine).
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supplement the Eleventh Amendment and bar the possibility of in-
junctive relief, as well as damages against states and their offi-
cials. 339 Finally, in at least one antitrust case, a court has applied
the Eleventh Amendment rather than the antitrust state action
defense.340
V. IMPACT OF SEMINOLE TRIBE ON ANTITRUST THEORY AND
PRACTICE
A. Distinguishing Policy Justifications Between Eleventh Amendment
and State Acting Doctrine
The differences between Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity and antitrust state action immunity illuminate the impor-
tant role of the antitrust laws and the goal of competition that the
Sherman and Clayton Acts were written to effectuate-the Eleventh
Amendment is an absolute bar for suits against states in federal
court, while the state action doctrine immunizes states from suit
only where the state has acted as a sovereign and made a conscious
decision to supplant competition. The state action doctrine then
seeks to balance the sometimes inconsistent goals of competition
and state sovereignty.
The judiciary developed the state action doctrine on the theory
that Congress intended the antitrust laws to reach activities regu-
lated by the states, but only in limited circumstances. While the
courts recognized that competition was an important concern, the
339. See Pharmaceutical and Diagnostic Serv., Inc., 801 F. Supp. at 513-14 (deter-
mining that even though Eleventh Amendment is not bar to injunctive relief by
plaintiff, state may be protected under state action doctrine). Citing the Ex parte
Young doctrine, the court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar claims
against the state for prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 513. The court found,
however, that the university defendants were entitled to state action immunity and
were not subject to injunctive relief under the antitrust law. Id. The court deter-
mined that because the defendants "constitute [d] the state acting in its sovereign
capacity... they... [were] entitled to Parker antitrust immunity." Id.
340. See Mizlou Television Network, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 603 F. Supp.
677, 680-81 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that because state commission was subunit of
state government, it is protected from suit under Eleventh Amendment). In
Mizlou, a television network brought an antitrust action against the Florida Citrus
Commission and others related to the awarding of television rights to broadcast
the Florida Citrus Bowl football game. Id. at 678-80. The court dismissed the ac-
tion on a variety of grounds including the Eleventh Amendment, but not the state
action doctrine. Id. at 680-81. The court found that the Commission was a "sub-
unit of the State" and was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 681.
Supporting its decision, the court relied solely on the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), for the proposi-
tion that a state and its agencies are immune from federal suits brought by citizens
and noncitizens unless the governmental entity had consented to suit. Mizlou, 603
F. Supp. at 680-81 (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100).
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ability of state governments to supplant competition and regulate
commerce was of equally important, but sometimes conflicting,
value. The text of the antitrust laws contain broad Constitution-like
language, written with the expectation that the federal courts would
develop a body of antitrust law by accretion in the same way that the
common law evolves.3 41 Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Parker v. Brown,342 it is clear that federal courts believed they had
the power to strike a balance between competition and state sover-
eignty.3 43 The Supreme Court, however, has now declared that this
balance always tips in favor of state sovereignty, with the result that
states are now immune from suit in federal court.344 Under the
Seminole Tribe rationale, the Eleventh Amendment will protect state
entities from liability for damages under the antitrust laws, even if
their regulation is not "affirmatively authorized" or "actively
supervised."3 45
B. Impact of Seminole Tribe Decision on Antitrust Cases
The actual impact of the Seminole Tribe decision on future anti-
trust cases will be real, although this should not be overstated. As
was discussed above, state governmental entities that are named as
defendants in antitrust actions have generally been found to be en-
titled to immunity because they met the requirements of the state
action doctrine.346 Some important antitrust cases, however, might
341. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Anti-
trust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free- enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms.").
342. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
343. For a discussion of Parker v. Brown, see supra notes 180-213 and accompa-
nying text.
344. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, see
supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
345. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 (1996) ("Even when
the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting states.").
346. For a discussion of the federal courts' use and analysis of the state action
doctrine, see supra notes 259-328 and accompanying text. Private parties have not
been so successful; in many cases, the state action doctrine has not immunized the
private defendants. See, e.g. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (determin-
ing that hospital peer review system was not actively supervised by state so defend-
ant doctors were not immune); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1980) (holding California wine producers
not immune to antitrust liability because state wine pricing system was controlled
by growers and state's minimal involvement was insufficient); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1976) (holding that although state commission
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have been decided differently had state sovereign immunity been
understood to be an absolute bar to suits against states in federal
court.3 47 The Eleventh Amendment, as defined by the majority in
Seminole Tribe, has rendered moot the possibility of antitrust liability
for damages against a state and its entities.3 48 This decision essen-
tially eliminates the need for state action immunity with respect to
suits against states, state departments and state agencies.3 49 Private
firms, however, are not sovereigns entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.3 50 Therefore, the state action doctrine is the only kind
of immunity that is potentially available to private defendants
charged with antitrust violations for actions taken pursuant to state
law or policy. This necessary state action immunity should continue
to be available to those private antitrust defendants who meet the
requirements of the doctrine.
1. Impact on Private Actors Regulated by States
It is important to note that Seminole Tribe did not preclude, ex-
plicitly or by necessary implication, the continued application of
the state action analysis, balancing interests of state sovereignty and
competition with respect to private defendants acting pursuant to
state regulation. Therefore, private parties acting pursuant to state
law or policy should continue to be covered by the state action doc-
trine and be immunized only when the state both has affirmatively
expressed an intention to supplant competition and has actively su-
pervised firms acting pursuant to that express intention. The sym-
metry, however, that had characterized the state action doctrine, in
that the immunity protected alike state entities and private firms
participated in free lightbulb program, individual lightbulb companies were sub-
ject to suit because companies exercised adequate freedom of choice).
347. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1987) (holding
that New York's liquor price regulations were not state action immune because
state did not actively supervise prices); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,
788-92 (1975) (determining that state bar was not immune to antitrust suit because
state through its supreme court did not authorize minimum fee schedule used).
Injunctive relief could have been sought against state officials under the Ex parte
Young doctrine. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.16 (stating that "an individ-
ual may obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state
officer's ongoing violation of federal law). For a discussion of the Ex parte Young
decision and its impact upon bringing suit against state officials, see supra notes 89-
94 and accompanying text.
348. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, see
supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
349. For a discussion of the possible impact of Ex pante Young and its progeny,
see supra note 89-94 and accompanying text.
350. For a discussion of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra notes 56-94 and
accompanying text.
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acting under state direction, has now been unbalanced and the
legal analysis for immunity from antitrust damages will likely di-
verge into different standards for states and state entities as op-
posed to private firms.
2. Predicted Response by States
The state action doctrine subjected states and private parties to
the same legal standard for antitrust immunity and exposed them
to the same risk of injunctive relief and possible treble damages.
Therefore, state governments had a strong incentive to articulate
the public interest that they sought to advance in supplanting the
competitive marketplace. This incentive extended to a careful con-
sideration of whether competition could achieve the state's goals or
whether the state should foreclose competition, for only a clear ar-
ticulation of state policy would satisfy the first prong of the Midcal
analysis. 35' In satisfying the second prong of the Midcal analysis,
state agencies and departments had a similar incentive to actually
and actively supervise private parties that acted pursuant to a state
law or policy.352
Thus, states had two incentives: (1) to promote their vision of
the public interest, including the foreclosure of competition in ap-
propriate circumstances353 and (2) to protect the state from liability
by following the requirements of the state action doctrine for anti-
trust immunity.35 4 The Seminole Tribe decision effectively eliminates
the latter incentive by holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity precludes suits against states and their entities in federal
court.3 5 5 Moreover, Congress is unable to abrogate such state im-
munity. 56 The primary incentive of promoting a thoughtful vision
for regulating the private sector still exists. Thus, conscientious
state legislators should continue to limit competition only when
necessary, even though the exposure to antitrust liability has been
351. For a discussion of the two-prong Midcal test, see supra notes 226-50 and
accompanying text.
352. For a discussion of the two-prong Midcal test, see supra notes 226-50 and
accompanying text.
353. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 212.1f, at 145-47 (noting that
opinions of legal commentators are mixed concerning the ability of states: to de-
cide when regulation should replace competition, to impose best regulatory
scheme and to make these decisions based upon public interest rather than special
interests).
354. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 5, 212, at 67-71.
355. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, see
supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
356. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, see
supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
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eliminated. States have another powerful incentive to continue to
follow the requirements of the state action doctrine-the wish to
provide antitrust immunity for the private parties that the state reg-
ulates. Allowing these private parties to function without threat of
antitrust liability is a necessary concession that states must provide
in order to ensure that the state's own regulatory policies will be
effectuated.3 57
3. Future of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine
The existence of broad Eleventh Amendment sovereign immu-
nity for both states and state entities means that the relevance and
need for the state action doctrine is now basically limited to private
actors. In seeking this immunity, private firms will be required to
take responsibility in monitoring the actions of state legislatures
and agencies. Private firms must, therefore, police government ac-
tivity to ensure that the state has satisfied the requirements of state
action immunity in order for these private firms to be the benefi-
ciaries of such immunity. This monitoring must satisfy the two-
prong Midcal test by ensuring: that the state's legislative expression
of intent to supplant competition is adequate, and that the state
agency charged with enforcing the policy possesses and exercises
the authority to supervise private action. Aside from being difficult
and expensive, these tasks may have unpredictable results. It is dif-
ficult for private firms to have advance knowledge of legislation
under consideration by state legislatures and of the justifications for
such legislation. Fortunately, private actors are privileged to lobby
357. Empirical evidence on whether states will strictly follow the requirements
of the state action doctrine necessary to provide immunity to private firms is, of
course, lacking at this time. The courts will answer this query in their decisions on
defendants' motions to dismiss based on state action immunity grounds. If states
continue to adhere to the strict requirements of the state action doctrine, then
such motions should continue to be granted at about the same rate as before Semi-
nole Tribe. If, however, states lack the incentives to protect private parties because
they are not themselves exposed to antitrust liability, then it is foreseeable that the
denial of motions to dismiss on state action immunity grounds will decrease while
there will be an increase in liability for private defendants.
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the legislative358 and executive3 59 branches.3 60 Self-protection may
make such lobbying activities an actual necessity.
The second Midcal prong, requiring a state entity to actively
supervise private firms, is equally important.3 61 Increasing the
states' involvement and relationship with private actors may raise
358. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 135-38 (1961) (stating that Sherman Act is not violated either when there
is attempt to influence legislation or when two or more persons associate in at-
tempting to persuade legislators to pass legislation that would create monopoly or
restraint on trade). In Noerr, multiple railroads and their associates commenced a
campaign that was directly aimed at destroying the trucking industry as a competi-
tive force. Id. at 129. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws did not
apply because activities that constitute petitioning to the government are generally
immune from antitrust liability, even if the result sought is to restrict competition.
Id. at 135-38. Although the Court did not specify whether its decision was based on
either the First Amendment right to petition the government or Congress's intent
that the Sherman Act not reach political activity, it is certain that most concerted
lobbying activities will be immune from antitrust condemnation. Id. at 137-38.
The Court cautioned, however, that "sham" petitioning was not immune from anti-
trust scrutiny. See id. at 144 (commenting that where publicity campaign is "osten-
sibly directed toward influencing governmental action, [then there] is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
... and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified"). For a discussion
of sham petitioning, see infra note 360 and accompanying text.
359. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965)
(reaffirming Noerr and stating that Sherman Act may not be used against those
seeking passage or influence of laws regardless of intent or purpose). In Pen-
nington, trustees of a coal mining company challenged the efforts of coal mine
operators and unions to influence the U.S. Secretary of Labor to increase certain
minimum wages. Id. at 659-60. The Court held that the Noerr rule allowing anti-
competitive lobbying efforts also applies to efforts to influence administrative gov-
ernmental decisions. Id. at 669-70. These administrative lobbying efforts, like leg-
islative lobbying, may lawfully have the goal of seeking a decision that effectively
eliminates competition. Id. at 670.
360. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc. ("PRE"), 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1926-28 (1993) (reiterating Noerr rule that sham
activities are subject to application of Sherman Act). In PRE, the Court clarified
the Noerr test for sham petitioning in the judicial context. See id. at 1928-29
(describing two-part definition of sham litigation). Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, stated:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reason-
able litigant could realistically expect success on the merits .... Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the liti-
gant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of
sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor" . . . through the "use [of] the governmental process-as opposed to
the outcome of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon."
Id. at 1928 (citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff must negate the "legal viability" of
the alleged sham lawsuit. Id.
361. For a discussion of the second prong of the Midcal, see supra notes 241-
50 and accompanying text.
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the risk of agency capture.3 62 This risk of capture may even be aug-
mented by the need for private parties to be more vigilant in ensur-
ing that the state regulators actively supervise them.363 Conversely,
the practical difficulties of forcing a reluctant, overworked or un-
derfunded state regulator to actually regulate are also apparent.
Last, but perhaps most practical, there is a difficulty in that plain-
tiffs will no longer have the option to join private and governmental
actors in an antitrust case because the governmental actors will be
protected by the absolute immunity of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.364 Moreover, if a private defendant is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court or is judgment-proof, the private plaintiff has no treble
damages remedy as the government is never liable for treble
damages. 365
362. See John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. Rv. 713, 723 (1986) (contending that Court decisions have been influ-
enced by recognition that "[r]egulation, formally conceived of as a method of ad-
vancing public interest over private advantage, in many instances came to be
conceived of as a method of subsidizing private interests at the expense of public
good"). Commentators of the law, such as Professor Wiley, argued that changes in
the Court's philosophy have led an evolving outlook on state regulatory policy. Id.
The concern arises from a finding that:
Government at virtually every level offers enormously lucrative potential
benefits. . . to competing producers. Typically these government bene-
fits are temptingly available. A relatively small number of incumbent
competitors support such measures with intensity, while consumer oppo-
sition is diluted and widely distributed. Producers are thus able to act as
an effective group far more frequently than their opposition. Govern-
ment market intervention is therefore very often an anticonsumer effort
to enlarge producers' share of social wealth.
Id. Professor Wiley views state regulation in a normative context. Instead of ap-
proaching state regulation with unwarranted suspicion, he urges the courts to ad-
dress state anticompetitive conduct by using a selective test for federal preemption
that would identify conduct deserving of facing liability under the antitrust laws.
Id. at 788-89.
363. See id. at 729-35 (discussing necessity of state regulatory interaction with
private actors for immunity to extend to private actors in wake of Midcal); see also
William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and
Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REv. 1099,
1134-36 (1981) (discussing Court's shift from public interest view of governmental
immunity after Parker to restrictive view after Midcal).
364. For a discussion of the majority's opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, see
supra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
365. See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990) ("Private
enforcement of the Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral part of
the congressional plan for protecting competition."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) ("Moreover, the purpose of giving
private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide
private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust
laws."); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NewJersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 318-19 (1965) (noting that purposes of antitrust laws included "use of self-
interest as a means of enforcement" and "help[ing] persons of small means who
are injured" (citations omitted)). The treble damages remedy and other antitrust
1997] 187
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the post-Seminole Tribe era, the legal analysis in situations
where states have chosen regulation over competition by sup-
planting the free functioning of markets, will depend solely upon
the identity of the defendant. If a state or one of its agencies or
departments is a named defendant, the broader Eleventh Amend-
ment analysis will control. Claims for damages against such a gov-
ernmental entity will be dismissed as mandated by the
constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity. If a private
firm is a named defendant, the narrower state action doctrine,
which has been crafted to balance true exercises of state sovereignty
against the goal of competition, will apply to provide immunity for
such a private defendant. As a policy matter, the state action doc-
trine will continue to protect private parties operating pursuant to a
state regulatory scheme. Although the risk of agency capture may
be increased, immunity for those regulated by the state is essential
for the success of any state regulatory program. Further, the more
limited state action immunity available to private firms will force
them to monitor state regulators to ensure that the requisite bal-
ancing process between exercising sovereign immunity and main-
taining competition is properly performed, as contemplated by the
state action doctrine. Finally, the state action doctrine has required
federal courts to balance competing factors: deference to state sov-
ereignty and protection of competition. The principles of Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity, as adopted in Seminole Tribe,
render the protection of the narrower state action doctrine unnec-
essary for state entities and eliminate competition as a
consideration.
rules such as the prohibition of suits by indirect purchasers were adopted, in part,
to promote private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Private plaintiffs are so im-
portant to the promotion of competition, in bringing actions for injunctions and
treble damages, that they have been described as "private attorneys general." See
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlanta Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D. Nev. 1990) (observing
that 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) "provides for treble damages and attorney's fees, creating
incentives for private attorneys general" (citation omitted)); Harris & Kenny, supra
note 27, at 651 (arguing that state action doctrine is preferable to Eleventh
Amendment immunity because it balances interest of regulating state against inter-
ests of injured consumers in obtaining redress).
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